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1PREFACE
My first encounter with Brittany, France, came in 1973 when I was 
bicycling through the Breton countryside with a group of Concordia 
College students. I befriended a Breton activist named Sylvain 
Phlipponneau, then twenty-one years of age, who made what I found to be 
an intriguing parallel between the plight of the American Indian and 
that of the outlying regions of France. He criticized the French 
government as over-bearing, excessively centralized, and with what he 
called a reckless disregard for the cultural integrity of the provinces. 
I was then seventeen, anxious to experience some of the residual youth­
ful activism of the previous decade. I attended a few of the meetings 
of the Front de la Liberation de la Bretagne, (FLB), at the time the 
most radical of French autonomist groups. Often speakers at FLB meet­
ings would break into Breton phrases, however, so as to keep French 
gens d Tarmes uninformed of their activities. Unfamiliar with this 
dialect, I was not as aware as I might otherwise have been as to the 
operations of the FLB during its heyday.
Sylvain's father, Michel Phlipponneau, is cited extensively as a 
reference throughout this thesis. He is a widely recognized authority 
on French regionalism, and has chaired many committees promoting Breton 
interests in that regard. He is a professor of geography at the 
University of Rennes. i only regret that, at the age of seventeen,
I had not done more extensive note-taking while a guest at the
2Phlipponneau home. I lost contact with Sylvain shortly after he 
finished his studies in applied urban geography at Oxford.
My second Breton interlude took me to the southern Breton coast, 
where I spent six months in 1976 as a student of French History in 
Nantes, Brittany. Here I continued to participate in many of the Breton 
cultural events, such as the test noz, or Breton dances, which were 
still popular and still somewhat of a "political statement" among the 
young.^ The following summer I moved to Paris to study French civiliza­
tion at the Sorbonne.
The real research phase for this thesis began in 1984, after a 
succession of Breton house guests renewed my interest in present-day 
political activism there. I returned to Brittany in the late spring of 
1985 to assess the current state of autonomist activities, and to con­
duct more formal research, both at the local archives and in the 
National Archives in Paris.
The National Archives in Paris proved to be the best resource for 
primary materials pertinent to this study. In a reference carton 
labeled MF7 13244" were contained publications of the Breiz Atao, which 
is Breton for "Brittany Above All," dating from 1919 to 1939. Much of 
the material in the Archives file was marked "confidential." But having 
access to it anyway, I discovered it consisted mostly of letters from 
the Commissioner of Police to the various local authorities in Quimper, 
Vannes, Saint-Briuec, and other hotbeds of autonomy. The letters from
Fest Noz’s often attracted over one hundred teenagers, dancing lu 
traditional Breton music skillfully played by young Breton musicians.
3the delegates of the Ministry of the Interior were most often followed 
by dutiful responses on the part of the prefects to keep close tabs on 
the activities of the autonomists, and to report on their status to the 
Director of Security in Paris.
The Archivist at the Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris recommended 
that I visit the Bibliotheque Mazarine, near the Hotel de Ville, which 
houses most of the writing of regional interest. Besides being treated 
to some of the most exquisite interior architecture in these two librar­
ies, I soon learned that the Parisian librarians and archivists, though 
gracious and pristinely professional, found my choice of topic somewhat 
peculiar. They advised me to go to the local archives of the region I 
was researching, which I, of course, was planning to do, though they 
expressed doubt that their colleagues in Brittany would be of much more 
assistance than they had been. In this assumption, they were mistaken.
Though the Bibliotheque Nationale contained copies of the munici­
pal records of every French village, many dating to the early nineteenth 
century and open for my perusal, they were not indexed by date other 
than by decade. Fascinating though it was to begin reading at random, 
despite the excellent exchange rate of dollar to franc during the summer 
of 1985, my husband and I could not stay in Paris forever.
The next phase of research took me to Brittany. The indexing 
problem proved to be identical in the local archives. But the impetus 
of my return to Brittany was not so much to spend time in the Archives 
as it was to spend time with the people. It was disappointing to learn,
4however, that much of the Breton activism I had witnessed in the early
2
1970fs was no longer apparent.
Much of the information cited, therefore, has been drawn from
secondary sources. The most notable French experts in this area are
not historians, but sociologists, political scientists, journalists, and
politicians. Among those cited are two French sociologists: Michael
Crozier, who complained of the French bureaucratic "traffic jam" in his
Societe bloquee, and Alain Peyrefitte whose work is entitled Le Mai
3
francais, or The Trouble With France. Journalist Jean-Jacques  >-   ------------------
Servan-Schreiber wrote Le Defi americain, or The American Challenge, in
1967 as a way to complain of the complacency of his fellow Frenchmen in
4
the suffocating French political community. Parallel autonomist move­
ments were surveyed in Charles R. Foster's Nations Without A State, 
which provides great insight into comparative studies of Breton separa­
tism with other active movements in western Europe.^
Finally, my indebtedness to the faculty at the University of 
Nebraska at Omaha must be acknowledged. Dr. Mark 0. Rousseau, professor 
of Sociology, shared with me his bibliography and first draft of a study
2
Personal observation in Brittany, May, 1986.
3
Michael Crozier has since published Strategies For Change 
(Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1982), and
Alain Peyrefitte, The Trouble With France (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1981).
0
Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, Le Defi americain (Paris: 
Denoel, 1967).
^Nations Without A State: Ethnic Minorities in Western Europe,
Charles R. Foster, editor (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980).
5he is presently undertaking of the decentralization of western Europe. 
His sources were most helpful and have been extensively cited in this
study. Dr. William C. Pratt, my advisor, has consistently urged me to
"see the larger picture" in the course of this investigation, to apply 
my findings to a broader world dilemma, and to keep in mind the original 
inspiration for this study. For that, and his many hours of work of a 
more tedious nature during the numerous re-write sessions, I am very 
grateful. And lastly, to Dr. Ert Gum, under whose sponsorship I origi­
nally began this research and who died in August of 1985, I express my
deep appreciation and heartfelt thanks for the encouragement and pluck 
he encouraged in me under his sponsorship. He is much missed.
6CHAPTER ONE
A Brief History of the Spirit of Autonomy in Brittany, France: 
From Original Settlement to the Present
In August of 1975, a bomb planted by a regional autonomist 
movement destroyed a small section of Versailles. The group claim­
ing responsibility was the Front de la Liberation de la Bretagne, 
or the FLB. The incident was the culmination of the regional reac­
tion against the domination of Paris over the province of Brittany. 
In the 1970's, there were several such regional efforts determined 
to preserve local tradition and color.  ^ However, after such 
expressions began to assume such a vehement pitch, they grew to 
command an attention that went beyond that of a quaint effort to 
preserve regional folklore. An exploration of Breton history might 
help to explain why the Bretons feel exploited by the 
French government.
Brittany is the western-most province of France. This stormy 
peninsula with its rugged coastline has long distinguished itself 
as remote and removed from the rest of France. Both the language
This period also marked high activity for the Basques and 
Corsican separatists.
7and the stock of people are unique to Brittany. The Breton race came,
for the most part, from English Cornwall in the sixth century.
By 753 Pepin the Short had amassed enough of the Breton interior
to form "la Marche de Bretagne," or "the Breton frontier." The region
then included the present-day cities of Nantes and Rennes. Charlemagne 
consolidated Gaullic control of the peninsula in 790. It was not until 
the year 826, under the reign of Louis the Pious, that a native-born 
Breton received administrative responsibility for governing the pro­
vince. This appointment proved to be a significant one in Breton 
history, as the figure of Nominoe, deputy of Brittany from 826 to 
848, defeated Louis’ successor Charles the Bald in a decisive battle 
near Redon. He was consecrated "King of Brittany" at Dol-en Bretagne
2
Jack E. Reece, The Bretons Against France (Chapel Hill: Univer­
sity of North Carolina Press, 1977), xxiii.
3
The ancestral language of Brittany is Breton, a Celtic dialect 
more related to Welsh and Irish than to French.
4 *Jean Thoraval, Les Grandes Etapes de la Civilisation F.rangaise
(Paris: Bordas, 1972), 12.
8on November 22, 848. Nominoe is thus considered the first Breton 
national hero.^
Breton resistance to the Norman expansion of 1066 proved success­
ful. By 1154, however, the Plantagenets assumed royal control of 
the region. Henry II appointed his son Geoffry II as Duke of Brittany 
in 1181. The Plantagenet line continued to administer Brittany through 
the thirteenth century. Then the fiefdom became the target of the 
rival powerful French nobles Jean de Monfort and Charles de Blois in 
the fourteenth. Edward III of England regained control in 1355, but 
Charles V of France reconquered the Duchy in 1380.
The most significant figure in early Breton history is the 
Duchesse Anne, who, by marrying Charles VIII in 1491 became Queen of 
France. Upon Charles’ death in 1498, Anne married his successor,
Louis XII. Their first-born son assumed the throne as Francis I in 
1513, the same year as Anne’s death. These two marriages de convenience 
procured the last acquisition of territory needed to create the hexagon 
of modern-day France. Breton nationalists have thus viewed Anne of 
Brittany as a symbol at once of regional pride and of irrevocable 
regional compromise.7
Under Francis I, Brittany was officially annexed as a province 
of France by the terms of the Treaty of Plessix in 1532. Though the
^Jean Markale, Histoire secrete de la Bretagne (Paris: Editions
Albin Michel, 1977), 115-16.
6Ibid. , 170-72.
7Ibid. , 184.
9Treaty marks the end of Breton independence from France, its terms were 
quite liberal. Among its provisions were the right of Bretons to refuse 
conscription in the royal armies, the right of Bretons to be tried in 
Breton courts, and the right of Bretons to refuse taxation from Paris
g
except in the event that such revenue be used exclusively in Brittany. 
Much as the twentieth century American Indian later came to realize 
that the treaties of the late eighteenth century were often far more 
generous than subsequent arrangements, Breton regionalists have often 
cited the Plessix Treaty in recent years as a model for modern-day
9autonomy policy.
The annexation, though petitioned for by some of the more politi­
cally ambitious Breton nobility, was not well received by the Breton 
population as a whole. The municipal records of the city of Rennes, 
the provincial capital, register incidents of regional resistance as 
early as the mid-seventeenth century. In 1675 the town’s tax office 
was destroyed by a crowd of more than two thousand people. The resi­
dences of over fifty aristocrats, thought to be collaborators with 
the King, also were burned.^
The most famous Breton revolt, however, occurred during the 
French Revolution. It is also the most misunderstood. The Chouans 
Revolt, often described as a royalist insurrection encouraged by the
g
Yannick Guin, Histoire de la Bretagne (Paris: Librairie Fran-
cais Maspero, 1977).
9
Olivier Mordrel, Breiz Atao ou Histoire et actualite du national- 
isme breton (Paris: Editions Alain Moreau, 1973), 29.
10Ibid., 33.
10
Church, was actually a regionalist upheaval.^  It was only after the
revolt was well underway that the royalists, mostly from the Vendee
region to the south, exploited the unrest to their own advantage.
The Breton role in the French Revolution is both pivotal and
ironic. Still steeped in seigneural tradition, a heritage that Brittany
retained longer than the rest of France, it was nonetheless a committee
of Breton nobles which history must credit with initiating many of the
idealistic tenets of the French Revolution. The Jacobin Club owes its
founding to the Club Breton, a group of Breton delegates to the States 
12General. Though soon disassociated with the Jacobins, history records
that this most reactionary of provinces, this royalist stronghold,
ironically lays claim to that of the birthplace of Jacobinism.
Brittany suffered for its subsequent allegiance to the ancien
regime. By the closing decades of the eighteenth century, hundreds of
nobles and priests had been massacred in the towns of Angers, Nantes,
13
and Quiberon in the south, and Rennes and Saint-Malo to the north.
Though not unique to Brittany, the consequences of the Counter-
Revolution did not spare the convents, monasteries, and aristo- 
14cratic chateaux.
^Donald Sutherland, The Chouans (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).
12Georges Lefebvre, The Coming of the French Revolution 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), 52.
13Yannick Guin, Histoire de la Bretagne, 23.
11
The years following the Revolution continued to bring hardship on
the ever-out-of-step Bretons. For example, the abolition of the private
✓
school system in favor of the national lycee system of Napoleon arrived 
at a time when scarcely one of fifty Bretons could speak French, the 
only language of instruction.^^ Needless to say, despite the grand 
visions of the Empire, the general education of the region did 
not improve.
Napoleon also restored the office of the prefect, often thought 
of as the bete noire of the French administrative system. As a replace­
ment of the intendant of the ancien regime, these envoys from Paris were 
sent out to all ninety-five departments, or administrative districts. 
Their function was to coordinate local needs with state services. More 
often, however, they were viewed as meddlers and, in times of active 
autonomist efforts, as informers to the Ministry of the Interior.^
They came to symbolize provincial distrust of Parisian authority.
Though the early nineteenth century was in many ways a politically 
repressive .era in Brittany due to an overzealous perfectoral system, the 
literature of the provinces bloomed. The Romantic movement of the nine­
teenth century inspired a newly awakened interest in the folklore of 
Brittany. Hersart de Villemarque compiled an important collection of
^Jacques Godechot, La contre-revolution: doctrine et
action, 1789-1904 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1961), 233.
^Brian Chapman, The Prefects and Provincial France (London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1955), 17.
12
Breton poetry in 1874, complete with a glossary of the Breton 
language.^ Unfortunately, partly because of this romantic nostalgia, 
there resulted a persistent confusion between actual Breton history and 
the legendary, or romanticized accounts. Even present-day students of 
the region tend to think of their own regional history as a quaint 
fairytale., often confusing actual historical figures with ficti­
tious legends!
Among the legends Brittany claims to have nurtured is that of
Tristan and Iseult, the love story of forbidden passion and chivalry
18which later evolved into the King Arthur tale. Brittany claims to 
be the residence of the wizard Merlin, where he and Vivian are said to 
still walk in the forest of Paimpont, deep in the interior of the 
province. The Druid ruins of Carnac, in south Brittany, are said 
to pre-date those of Stonehenge. Nature worship and pantheism are 
still reflected in Breton folk customs, despite the fact that 
Brittany is a stronghold of Catholicism. One does not have to dig 
too deeply, however, to discover that roadside shrines to the Virgin 
Mary were formerly shrines to pagan goddesses, or even to Anne
^Jean Botherel, La Bretagne Contre Paris (Paris: Editions de la
Table Ronde, 1969), 42.
18The first written version of the Romance of Tristan and Iseult 
is credited to Beroul, in the twelfth century. The oral tradition 
traces the tale to Brittany in the preceding centuries, and perhaps 
to the Moors of southern France before that. Both Brittany and 
Languedoc have a strong oral tradition: the Breton bards and the
troubadours of Occitania perpetuated this love story for centuries 
before Chretienne de Troyes translated it into Old French, changing 
the names from the Breton derivatives to the Lancelot and Guenivere of 
the King Arthur legends. Joseph Bedier, Le Roman et Tristan et Iseult 
(Paris: L ’Edition d’Art, 1946), i-vii.
13
19of Brittany. The cosmetics have changed, but the Celtic roots 
go deep.
Thanks to the scholarly interest that Villemarque had initiated
in Breton ancestry, the credibility of the region's actual heritage
began to be recognized. The Breton language also began to enjoy a new
appreciation. In certain circles, the Breton language had become the
preferred language of erudite scholars. Yet, in the general population
of the region it had become taboo, to such a degree that young Breton
20school children were punished if they were caught speaking it.
The issue of language has remained a volatile one. Breton is 
not a dialect, but a Celtic language. It. is more related to the Gaelic 
spoken in Ireland or Wales than to modern French. It is a testament 
to the isolation of Brittany that the language has remained intact 
over the many centuries of its incorporation as a French province. 
Though Welsh has survived in Wales and is commonly spoken there, the 
number of Bretons fluent in their native tongue is much lower than in 
other Celtic regions. The language most directly linked to Breton is 
a Celtic dialect spoken only in Cornwall. After a century or more of 
disuse, the last documented speaker of this ancestral Breton tongue 
was an elderly woman living outside of Southampton. She died in 
the 1930’s.21
19Personal observation, Brittany, summer of 1973.
20 * Maurice Duhamel, La question bretonne dans son cadre europeen
(Quimper: Cahiers de l'avenir de la Bretagne, 1978), .22.
21Mordel, Breiz Atao, 33.
14
Though an obvious comparison might be made with the attempts of 
the Quebecois to make Canada a bilingual, bi-cultural state, the propor­
tion of Bretons actually capable of speaking their ancestral language 
is so small as to make it more of a symbolic demand than a response to 
a pressing, unaddressed concern. Perhaps a more accurate parallel is 
that of the American Indian. Breton activists in the heyday of region- 
alist efforts in the 1960Ts and early 1970Ts often compared the plight 
of their province with that of the American Indian: both races were
ultimately contained to a limited area as the conquering race advanced;
both races are struggling to keep their languages alive and preserve
22what they can of their native traditions and customs.
In 1843 the first Breton Society, the Association Bretonne, was 
23founded. Intended as a social support group for Breton farmers and 
basically non-political in orientation, the association was dissolved 
nevertheless in 1857 by Napoleon III, who objected to its anti­
centralist tendencies. The first Congress of Celtic Concerns took 
place in Saint-Brieuc, Brittany in 1867. Subsequently, a petition
allowing for the right to teach the Breton language in public schools
24was presented to the French government. One of the early promoters 
of this regionalist effort was Charles De Gaulle I, great uncle of the 
twentieth century president. Nothing came of this petition. The mid-
22Personal observation, Brittany, summer of 1973.
23Bothorel, La Bretagne contra Paris, 57.
24Michel Phlipponneau, Debout Bretagne! (Saint-Brieuc: Presses
Universitaires de Bretagne, 1970), 39.
15
nineteenth century still saw Brittany in the throes of a harsh and
vigorous prefectoral system. Through the return of the monarchy, on to
the Second Republic, through Napoleon III and into the Third Republic,
the province of Brittany exerted only as much political activity as
25the prefects would allow.
In 1898 a second effort at regional education, that of the Union
Bretonne Regionaliste, founded by the determined Marquis de
1’Estourbeillon, briefly appeared on the political scene. Instead of
charting a progressive course for efforts toward cultural preservation,
however, regional expression in Brittany deteriorated. By 1909 the
Breton language was officially prohibited at Mass, and two years later
26it was forbidden in the schools by the Ministry of Education.
Another incident of that same year, 1911, is also worthy of 
mention, though it is not directly tied to the language or education 
question. A ceremony was planned in Rennes, the provincial capital, 
to present town officials with a gift from the French government. The 
gift was a sculpture, meant to commemorate the union of Brittany and 
France, showing the Duchesse Anne on her knees, imploring Louis XII to 
become, at the same time, master of Brittany and master of herself.
A young student in the crowd began to throw rocks to demonstrate his 
displeasure with the message conveyed, and soon the assembled crowd
25Brian Chapman, The Prefects and Provincial France (London: 
George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1955)* p. 27.
26Ibid., 45.
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had to be dispersed by state police. University students have often 
been the most visible element of the more radical efforts toward 
autonomy. The 1960’s would see a similar student involvement 
in Brittany.
During World War I, public concern over the destiny of the pro­
vinces of Alsace and Lorraine understandably was a more pressing concern 
than Breton autonomy. But soon after the Great War, the most notorious 
of all Breton autonomist movements was founded, the Breiz Atao. As 
viewed today, the first publications of this remarkable organization 
are strikingly modern in content. They speak of the dangers of a 
consumer-oriented society, of the necessity of a strong and persistent 
regionalism in France, and of the idea of a European federation which 
could protect the rights of all European minorities. The publications 
also discuss, as early as 1918, the dangers of the industrial cartels
which were about to align themselves with the centralized nations, and
28which would serve to unduly influence international politics.
Brittany’s economic potential has indeed been underdeveloped.
At the time of its annexation in 1532 it had harbored one of the 
greatest mercantile fleets of all Europe. Brittany is geographically 
situated so as to enjoy access to the commercial activity of England, 
Spain, and North America. But the history of France, unfortunately, 
proved such that Brittany often found itself at war, unwittingly, with
27Ibid., 47.
28Breiz Atao, Archives Nationale de France, Paris, France. 
Reference F7 13244.
17
the first two markets. Even today, the vast potential of Brittany’s
strategic location as a point of departure is unrealized. A chastizing
editorial in the daily Le Monde (1969), charged that:
France has succeeded in the exploit of transforming 
into a sterile Sahara the living ocean of which the 
Breton peninsula is the bridgehead. What could be 
delivered cheaply to Brittany by sea she is forced 
to buy from the Continent: her coals from the
North, her steel from Lorraine, her cattle from 
Beauce. What she produces she cannot export by 
sea; what should be a point of departure has 
become a cul-de-sac.29
In the 1930’s, the Germans began to appeal to this economic
potential of Brittany. Cleverly, the German government began making
overtures to the Bretons, and soon the region was labeled sympathetic
to the Nazis. The German tactic succeeded: Brittany, like certain
regions in eastern France, was considered friendly territory to the
enemy during World War II. One historian asserts that after the war
years, one needed only to have a Breton book in one's library to be
30subject to arrest.
It was at this time that some of the most extremist movements 
began to appear on the Breton political scene. The secret society
31Gwenn Ha Du, "Black and White," openly fascist and anti-Christian, 
was founded in 1932. The leader of this movement, Celestin Laine, 
was an eccentric who wanted a return to the ancient practices of the
29Le Monde, February 4, 1969, 13.
30Mordel, Breiz Atao, 45.
■^Michel Phlipponneau, La Gauche et les regions (Paris: Calmann- 
Levy, 1967, 28.
18
Druids. He had few disciples. However, those he did convert were 
probably responsible for the "accidental" train derailments which often 
beset the itinerary of Parisian officials on their way to Brittany in 
the 1930’s. Laine is also credited for having overturned the above 
described statue of a supplicant Anne of Brittany during a govern- 
mental ceremony.
Once World War II began, the most outspoken of German sympathizers 
were exiled. As if to negate its reputation as a collaborist strong­
hold, Brittany sent a large number of her soldiers to the front: twice
the number of any other French region. She also lost the largest number 
of men: one out of four, as compared to the national average of one
* • u 3*out of eight.
Following the war, political resistance in Brittany resumed. This 
time, Brittany found some support from other regions in her struggle 
against the "Parisian technocrats." The 1940's saw a nationwide pro­
test against the exorbitant cost of the transportation of produce from 
the countryside to the major French markets. Transportation costs made
it difficult for a small commercial enterprise to survive any distance 
35from Paris. One of the greatest shortcomings of the modern-day French 
State is its method of calculating its national economic policies from
32Ibid., 30.
33Guin, Histoire de la Bretagne, 55.
34 ' Phlipponneau, La Gauche et leg regions, 56.
35Ibid., 83.
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Paris, with no regard whatsoever for the individual economies of the
36
provinces it so relies upon.
By 1949, Brittany was one of the first of the peripheral provinces 
to respond to this problem. The Cotnltl d 'Etude et de Liaison des 
Interets Bretons, or the CELIB, was founded. Rene Plevon was its presi­
dent from 1949 to 1972. Its faith in the government of the newly 
elected Charles De Galle was, at first, unquestioning. But soon it 
became clear that his highly touted regionalist program would begin only 
after he had first secured the "glory of France," and perhaps, more 
accurately, the "glory of Charles De Gaulle." The conflict became so 
impassioned between De Gaulle and the regionalists that in 1961 it was 
necessary to stifle the microphones at a welcoming rally in Quimper,
where the mayor had just challenged the President, asking him to please
37explain to the crowd his "non-existent regional reforms."
The 1960's were, of course, a period of political activity in many 
fields. In Brittany, the decade was especially productive. In 1962 
Mouvement pour 11 Organization de la Bretagne (MOB), was formed. This 
group was a short-lived off-shoot of the more moderate Union 
Democratique Bretonne (UDB), a decentralist group with autonomist 
leanings that still exists today. Records in the archives in Vannes 
attest that the UDB enjoyed a strong showing in the municipal elections 
there in the Spring of 1985. The organization's concerns included the
•J iT
Alain Peyrefitte, Le Mai Francais (Paris: Librairie Guillmard,
1979).
37 /
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plight of the farmers in their struggles against Common Market price
3
ceilings, the unemployment problem, and the depressed regional economy.
/
In 1966 the Front de la Liberation de la Bretagne (FLB) was
created. This group's aspirations were more radical. The membership
was predominantly university students, and the mood and tactics were
very much in keeping with the general malaise and subsequent student
activism prevalent in western Europe and the United States in the late
1960's. No one was killed in what the FLB billed as its terrorism
souriant ("smiling terrorism"), but in the mid 1970's the organization
began to associate, informally, with the Irish Republican Army, causing
the Breton organization to go even further underground.
The 1980's version of the FLB seems to be the Front Culturel
Progressiste Breton. It presently publishes its own newsletter,
La Liberte Morbihan. Morbihan is the name of the department in which
Rennes, the Breton provincial capital, is located. In a 1984 edition
it championed the cause of bilingualism in Brittany, advocating the use
of both Breton and French on radio, local television, and during offi-
39cial banking transactions. The prospect of the use of the ancestral 
language is unlikely. More realistic is a proposal that residents have 
access to an interpreter fluent in Breton, upon request, before official 
transactions are completed.
38Quest France, May 16, 1985, 1.
39 . 'La Liberte Morbihan (Rennes, Brittany), May 5, 1985.
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The UDB publishes a more moderate newsletter, Le Peuple Breton. 
Here, it champions the causes and concerns of Breton farmers and fisher­
men, and seems to be less enthusiastic about efforts toward autonomy, 
and more concerned with economic improvements in the region. The
present Socialist administration, though now with an opposition parlia- 
41ment, had advocated a program of regional reform, but Bretons have 
seen such platforms before, and from both sides of the politi­
cal spectrum.
Most of the Breton autonomist groups of the twentieth century have 
been left-wing. Though it is perhaps not surprising that the more radi­
cal factions, such as the FLB, be considered leftist, support for Breton 
autonomy had not always come from the Left. Breton autonomy in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century was considered a right-wing 
movement. The political labeling seems to alternate; Breton concerns 
do not.
Brittany has consistently rejected the persistent posturing of 
Paris as the superior, controlling force of French government. The 
impetus for keeping Paris in check has been at times born of political 
ideology, at times motivated by economic advantage. From the revolu­
tionary rhetoric of the Club Breton, to the reactionary zeal of Breton
40 'Le Peuple Breton, a publication of the Union Democratique
Breton, Brest, Brittany.
41The March, 1986 legislative elections resulted in a new, 
unprecedented era of power-sharing in French government. Mitterand’s 
remaining two years as president will now be shared by Gaullist Premier 
Jacques Chirac, who replaced Mitterrand’s Socialist colleague, Laurent 
Fabius. The Socialists presently hold a minority 206 seats in the 
577-seat National Assembly.
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royalists, to the romantic nostalgia for provincial innocence of the 
nineteenth century, to the precarious politics of the twentieth, 
Brittany has sounded a chord all its own.
23
CHAPTER TWO
Brittany During the French Revolution, 1789-1815:
An Inconsistent Legacy
Feudalism died hard in Brittany. Some historians claim that 
a feudal economy persisted in the province until 1921, when the 
language of a state land title bill replaced the term locataire, 
meaning one tied to the land, with the twentieth century term pro- 
prietaire, meaning property owner. Though the feudal title was 
abolished in France by a decree of August 15, 1789, only the peasant 
who already owned allodial land along the parameters of the feudal 
estate, was free of financial bond to his seigneur. Tenant farmers 
and sharecroppers remained subject to levies.'*' While primary sources 
are difficult to procure, the inventory of lands and revenues, then 
referred to as the assiettes, reveal that at the time of the Revolu­
tion, there were more leased lands in Brittany than the rest 
2
of France.
Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, "The Deserted Villages of France,"
Rural Society in France: Selections from Annales d'histoire economique
et sociale, Robert Forster and Orest Ranum, editors (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1977), 257-290.
2Ibid., 290.
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The south of France had long been receptive to the private owner­
ship of small plots of land. However, a census of 1723 showed that in
Normandy and Brittany the proportion of the population which enjoyed
3
private ownership was only 20 percent, the lowest in the nation. In
France, as in many other places, those who fed the rest of the world
had the least to eat themselves. An English historian visiting the
Breton countryside in the Spring of 1789 described what he saw as
4
nothing but "poverty, brutality, and filth."
Two concentrations of power remained vital in Brittany . long after 
they had lost their political influence over the rest of France: the
nobility and the Church. The noblesse d 1 epee, those territorial lords 
who laid claim not only to most of the countryside but to the towns 
and cities as well, including the provincial capital of Rennes, stayed 
in power in spirit, if not in law, long after the Revolution. A demo­
graphic study of the village of Plonivel, in Haute Bretagne, shows how 
slight was the change in social structure after the Revolution.^
Although the consistent strength of the local nobility can be 
cited as the key to Breton resistance to the Revolution, thus marking 
the province’s first gesture of political autonomy, the nobility was 
not diametrically opposed to the revolutionary rhetoric of individual
3
Will and Ariel Durant, The Age of Voltaire (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1963), 259.
^Will and Ariel Durant, Rousseau and the Revolution (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1967), 931.
^Yannick Guin, Histoire de la Bretagne (Paris: Librairie
Fran^aise Maspero, 1977), 89-90.
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liberties. The character of the nobility was changing. Brittany, along 
with the rest of western Europe, was rapidly establishing a mercantile 
economy. Long involved in the lucrative slave trade to the colonies, 
the port town of Brest became a center of mercantile wealth in the late 
eighteenth century.^ The landed nobility still ranked in the upper 
class, but it now shared its prestige with a fast-growing upper middle 
class. This transformation of wealth was more prominent in other areas 
of France than in Brittany, but the shift does help to explain initial 
Breton support for the Revolution.
More consistently repressive was the administrative vanguard of 
the noblesse de robe, those members of parliament who ruled the province 
from far-away Paris. A Parisian envoy disclosed his abhorrence of the 
area by calling its inhabitants "amongst the most ignorant, cruel, and 
religious in the country."^ Here begins the most consistent and deep- 
seated anxiety in Breton history: the resentment of the provincial
natives toward the Parisian political hierarchy. The hated figure of 
the provincial prefect, the local officer who reported to Paris and who 
lived more sumptuously, ate more conspicuously, and had no friends in 
the community which he purportedly served, became the target of provin-
g
cial resentment since the office was first created.
6Ibid., 89.
^J. M. Thompson, The French Revolution (New York: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1966), 378.
g
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Originally given the title of intendants, the Parisian envoy to 
the provinces was part of the centralization plan orchestrated by 
Cardinal Richelieu under Louis XIII. The post was temporarily abolished 
in 1648 with the first convening of parlement of Paris, but was 
reinstated in 1654.^ At the time of the French Revolution there were 
thirty-two intendants in the provinces. The intendant had the power to 
issue ordinances for the administration and execution of law. In addi­
tion to controlling the local police, he was the supreme 
11tax collector.
The resistance of the nobility to what it perceived as foreign 
taxation took on a political tone on the eve of the Revolution. As 
early as 1788 the provincial parlement of Rennes, made up mostly of 
landed nobility, was espousing some of the most democratic rhetoric 
of the era. In a declaration of that year, liberal references to
12Jean-Jacques Rousseau's concept of the "general will" were evident.
The parlements of Grenoble and a few other French cities were making 
similar statements at the time, but one of the greatest ironies of 
the Breton role in the French Revolution was its early commitment to 
the Jacobin cause, and its subsequent early denunciation of the 
Revolutionary regime.
9Ibid., 12.
1QIbid,, 13,
H T1 • iIbid.
12Durant, Rousseau and the Revolution, 849.
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The Breton parlement was articulate and courageous in its early
demands for individual liberties and religious freedom. Breton
intendant Bertrand de Moleville declared in 1788 "that man is born
free, that originally men are equal, [and] that these truths have no 
13need of proof." The earliest formal association to espouse such
ideals was the Club Breton, originally founded in that same year by
14the Breton deputies of the States General. The membership included
many highly educated and respected landed nobles who were receptive
to seigneurial reforms. Most were supportive of the abolition of
seigneurial banalities and other feudal fees.^ Deputy Cottin of
Nantes made a motion to abolish the manorial court system, while other
16Breton deputies condemned the tithe.
Not all topics under discussion were so wide-sweeping, nor were 
all the reforms enthusiastically received. A portent of counter- 
Revolutionary sentiment was in evidence as early as August 3, 1789, 
when six Breton nobles left a meeting to protest the Club's stance 
on the suspension of the Church tithe. Other members were more 
interested in issues of a more local nature, such as hunting 
rights and other practical concerns.^ These more moderate
13Ibid., 849.
14Georges Lefebvre, The Coming of the Revolution (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), 158.
15Ibid.
16Ibid., 159.
17Ibid., 160.
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voices were soon overtaken by the heady excitement of pre-
Revolutionary France.
In September the Club opened its membership to non-Bretons,
including such revolutionary figures as Mirabeau, Seiyes, and
Robespierre. The Club met in special committee as the one hundred
members resolved to "obliterate the privileges of classes, provinces,
18towns, and corporations." By October of 1789, the Club Breton
moved its headquarters from Rennes to Paris, and renamed itself
/ / 19the Societe des Jacobins. Thus did the "stronghold of feudalism"
give birth to the ideals of the French Revolution. Yet this same 
province is equally championed in history texts as the birthplace of 
the Counter-Revolution. This is but one of many ironies in the con­
tradictory history of the independently spirited province 
of Brittany.
To understand the ambiguous role of Brittany in the French 
Revolution one must remember that membership in the early Jacobin 
Clubs consisted of deputies, and, later, men of science and 
literature. Dues were relatively high. Among the cherished 
liberties they professed to safeguard was that of private property. 
Jacobin rhetoric already appeared too diluted for the tastes of 
Marat, Danton, and Robespierre, who founded the more radical 
Cordeliers Club. Lafayette, Talleyrand, and Lavoisier found it to 
be too radical, and hurriedly founded the Societe de 1789 to voice
19Thompson, The French Revolution, 113.
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support for the monarchy. The Breton nobility underwent a similar
shift in allegiance late in the year of 1789, casting its lot with
20
the monarchy, thus condemning it to fall with the King.
The strongest pro-monarchy sentiments came from the wealthy 
coastal city of St-Malo on the English channel; from Rennes, the
provincial capital; and from south Brittany, in the present-day
* 21 department of the Loire-Atlantique. Breton historian Yannick Guin
claims that rural Brittany, the region of Finistere, never lost its
revolutionary fervor and to this day has a markedly more socialist
22stance on most issues than does the rest of the province.
The severing of Brittany's affiliation with the French Revolution 
is best explained, however, by the mere fact that the Jacobin Club 
was no longer the proud offspring of the Club Breton, but the ungrateful 
son who left the countryside for Paris, and promptly lost all affection 
for his rural roots. It was Paris, not Louis XVI, that became the 
focus of resentment for the alienated Breton nobility. Brittany 
quickly became host to the regionalist aspirations of the Girondins. 
Though still associated with the Jacobins in the beginning, the 
Girondins soon resented the rule of all France by Paris alone.
Among the proposals of the Breton Girondistes was the creation of 
a federal republic of self-governing provinces. Though not as
2  Q
Jean Markale, Histoire secrete de la Bretagne (Paris: Editions
Albin Michel, 1977), 185.
21Guin, Histoire de la Bretagne, 55.
22Z Ibid.
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blatantly autonomous in its program, government-sponsored reform move­
ments of the late 1950's drew on some of the Girondins' original ideas
23when forming their own proposals.
By early 1790, the Girondin impulse in the provinces consolidated.
Resistance to the radicalism of Marat and Robespierre grew especially
strong in Brittany, where the trading centers of Brest and Nantes
showed increased protectionalism. The town of Brest nearly conspired
successfully to open its port to a British squadron cruising nearby in
24April of that year. By May the Club Breton changed its name to the 
Societe des Amis de la Constitution. Its meeting place was a former 
monastery near the Tuileries in Paris. Though the membership now 
boasted a dramatic increase from the original few deputies of the dele­
gation, Brittany was in the throes of a federalist reaction against the
25centralist tenets of the Constituent Assembly.
The centralist efforts of the Directory were immediate and sweep­
ing. On September 13, 1789, a Committee of Eight, four Parisians and 
four provincials, proposed to divide France into eighty-three 
departments. A further law of January 8, 1790, decreed that each 
department had an elected assembly of thirty-six counselors, whose 
executive would be responsible for administrative and police actions, 
as well as tax assessment. The Revolutionary Assembly came to rely
23 *Michel Phlipponneau, Debout Bretagne! (Saint-Brieuc: Presses
Universitaires de Bretagne, 1970).
24Lefebvre, Coming of Revolution, 102.
2^Ibid., 103.
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more and more upon its own commissaires, the Revolutionary replacement
for the office of intendant, who were sent out from Paris to stifle
Counter-Revolutionary movements in the provinces. Appointed by the
Committee of Public Safety, these commissaires assumed dictatorial
2 6powers in the provinces to which they were sent.
If Breton nobility grew to resent the spirit of ’89 for taking
away its potential economic initiative, the Breton peasantry feared
the dismantling of the two structures it had looked to for centuries
of support: the monarchy and the Church. Far from seeing themselves
as exploited victims of these hierarchical giants, the-common folk
were fiercely protective of their King. This much of old seigneural
order did remain intact in Brittany: a majority of peasants remained
27
economically dependent upon the landed nobility.
The old order was tested and true in Brittany. Landless
peasants professed their devotion to the lord of the manor; in
return, they were allowed to earn a subsistence level existence off
his land. This dynamic had a parallel with that of the landed
nobility and the monarchy: the former professing its allegiance,
both economic and personal, to its leige lord, the person of the King.
Such allegiances persisted. Regret over the demise of the monarchy
can be heard to this day around the dinner table of the more astute
28pillars of the venerable communities of Saint Malo and Quiberon.
26Chapman, Prefects, 13.
27 ^Markale, Histoire secrete, 187.
28 a 
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After the execution of King Louis XVI in 1791, the Revolution entered
its most violent phase.
The region of Vendee, just south of Brittany, suffered the most
casualties in the brutal uprisings that swept the countryside during
the Terror. On March 10, 1793, 1500 citizens of the town of Machecoul
attacked the office of the National Guard, killing him along with the
constitutional cure and the justice of the peace. One hundred Bretons
had been killed in Saint Brieuc two years earlier to prevent an
impending collaboration with sympathizers of the imprisoned King.
When the King and Queen were finally guillotined, the provinces were
outraged. Barbaroux, the Breton representative under the Directory,
claimed in 1793 that
it was for the Bretons and Marseillais to reverse 
the tyrant Robespierre; it was a Breton and 
myself who stood up against the assassins; it was 
for the Bretons and Marseillais once more to save 
the Republic from these Jacobin anarchists.^
The Counter-Revolution was further strengthened in Brittany by
the staunch and consistent support she gave to the Church. The town
priest, though often maligned in local lore, was nevertheless the
30patriarch of village life. The local church was not simply the 
site for Sunday mass, but the town's focal point. It often served 
as the site for schools, farmers' associations, and political meetings. 
Unlike his colleagues in Paris or the other large French cities, the
29Thompson, French Revolution, 399.
30An example of such irreverence is evidenced in many Breton 
folksongs, most notably Les filles de Forges.
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local cure in Brittany was often as poor as his flock. Though granted 
immunities and privileges which made the Church a consistent target of 
criticism in many parts of Europe, Brittany remained a Catholic strong­
hold, emotionally devoted to its parish priest and respectful uf iis 
imposed order. It is the boundaries of the individual paroisse (parish) 
that defined the administrative division of the canton which date from
the ancien regime. The local cure was thus the authority figure who
32 *was linked most directly to the people. When the cures began to be
persecuted and murdered during the Terror, the Breton response was one
of horror and panic, not of liberation.
Bolstered by the weakening of the Revolutionary Council, the local
departments in Brittany, as in many French provinces, began to usurp
more and more control from the Parisian envoys. The supervision of
revolutionary law was handed over to the local departments. The
official link between the Convention and the provinces was now that
33of the Vigilance Committee of each canton. Hated by the communities 
they administered, these outsiders from Paris were drummed out of 
service by the local assemblies, often leaving the cantons in virtual 
anarchy. Without any remaining framework of state-sponsored local 
government, Counter-Revolutionary activities ran rampant. Counter- 
Revolutionary insurrections in Saint Malo, Rennes, Quiberon, and
31Durant, Age of Voltaire, 254.
32Markale, Histoire secrete, 42.
33
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Nantes all occurred in the Spring of 1793. The decisive collaboration
between the peasant revolts and the Counter-Revolution of the Breton
aristocracy came at the end of March. The priests and the local elites,
perhaps because their hand was forced by the peasantry, perhaps because
the timing was right, came out from the shadows and took charge of the
ideological, political, and military aspects of the Counter-
35Revolutionary movement, later to be termed the Chouanerie.
The departmental assemblies became instruments of the various 
political factions: royalists, Girondins, and moderates used their
influence to ferment discontent against the Jacobins. The Jacobins 
retaliated. On June 15, 1793, hundreds of Girondists met at the Nantes 
cathedral on the Place St. Pierre, in the shadow of the chateau of the 
Duchesse Anne, patron Saint of Brittany, to declare their resistance 
to the Jacobins of Paris. The famous resistance of the Chouanerie, 
that unlikely coalition of Breton nobility and a peasantry loyal to 
both its social superiors and its Church, had begun. Breton historian 
Yannick Guin sees tremendous socio-political significance in this 
collaboration of diverse classes united in their resistance to 
Revolutionary demands:
Guin, Histoire de la Bretagne, 55.
35The Chouanerie Revolt was the best known insurrection in western 
France after the Revolution. Though Breton nobles from Saint Malo 
and Rennes were known to have been participants, the Chouans are more 
accurately placed as residents of the Vendee, a monarchist stronghold 
south of the Loire River, and thus not part of Brittany proper.
Donald Sutherland, The Chouans: The Social Origins of Popular
Counter-Revolution in Upper Brittany, 1770-1796 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1982).
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The fickle nature of bourgeois revolution and the 
rumblings of a civil war reveal the violent antago­
nism which was beginning— as a result of a dis­
integrating feudal system— which had pitched an 
agrarian bloc, cemented in by religious idealism 
against an urban bloc, already smitted with the
first glimmers of proletarian c o n s c i o u s n e s s .36
In July of 1793, several Breton notables, including many priests
were imprisoned in N a n t e s . T h e  Breton clergy, staunchly opposed to
the secularism of the Civil Constitution of 1790 and 1791, now faced
the far more concrete application of Revolutionary ideals: the
nationalization of Church property. Though the Bretons were outraged
by the slaughtering of their cures, they, too, benefited from the
38release and subsequent sale of Church lands. In typical Breton 
fashion, the province was at the forefront of both impulses of the 
Revolution: anticipating the lofty ideals of the revolutionary
radicals, only to respond just as quickly to its own undeniable self- 
interest. With Robespierre's arrest and execution in July, 1794, 
the Revolution was again returned to the bourgeoisie.
Historians who hold to the "Great Man" theory of history love to 
speculate on what would have been the course of France had it not 
benefited from the vision, dynamism, and military skill of Napoleon 
Bonaparte. The impact of his organizational and administrative trans­
formation of France is incomparable. The rigorous efforts of Napoleon
36Guin, Histoire de la Bretagne, 83. My translation.
37Ibid., 58.
38Ibid., 60.
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to centralize, standardize, and consolidate his Empire made the period
in which the bourgeoisie in Brittany was able to enjoy a tax-free,
bureaucracy-free existence very short-lived.
The provinces were left without any administrative authority
after the Terror and the fall of the Directory. The office of
intendant under the ancien regime, and that of commissaire under the
Constituent Assembly, had both been dissolved. Napoleon was to find
their ultimate replacement in the prefect. The first time the term
prefet was used was during the Counsulship. It was suggested by
Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyes, who modeled the office on that of the Roman 
39Prefect. Napoleon referred to the prefects as the "empereurs aux 
40petits pieds," or little-footed emperors.
Historian Jacques Godechot gives a detailed account of how the
Napoleonic prefectoral system was organized in his Les institutions
/ 41de la France sous la Revolution et 1’Empire. The system continues
to operate much as Napoleon had originally devised. Beginning with 
the lowest echelon is the commune, the smallest administrative unit 
in France. So many villages and hamlets qualify as separate adminis­
trative entities that, to this day, France has the highest number of 
distinct administrative posts in all of Europe. The fertile ground 
for a spiraling bureaucracy had begun. Each cluster of communes had
39Chapman, Prefects, 18. 
4QIbid., 17.
Jacques Godechot, Les institutions de la France sous la 
Revolution et lfEmpire (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1968).
its chef-lieu, roughly the equivalent of a county seat. The chef- 
lieu became the administrative center of each department, whose 
boundaries were intentionally drawn in such a way that no one within
the department would be farther than a day’s horseride from the admini
42 *■trative center. Napoleon increased the number of departments from
the eighty-three created by the Constituent Assembly, to the present-
43day number of ninety-five.
Each department was served by a departmental prefect. All
prefects during the Empire were appointed and removed by Napoleon.
Their authority was thus unchecked by local supervision. The prefect
was provided with special funds, furnished by the state, to augment
his living expenses. The rationale was that such supplemental funds
would put him beyond the temptation of reaching into the local coffers
44But such provisions did not always prevent such abuse. Like the 
commissaires before him, the prefect assessed and collected taxes.
This role, his being an outsider, and his sumptuous living conditions 
all made him a target of resentment among the local residents.
Each prefect appointed a sub-prefect, whose task was to provide 
for the public welfare of his department. The mayor of each village 
was responsible for carrying out the instructions of the. prefect and 
sub-prefect. The prefects themselves answered directly to the
Peter A. Gourevitch, Paris and the Provinces (Berkeley: Uni­
versity of California Press, 1980), 33.
43Godechot, Les institutions de la France, 733.
44Chapman, Prefects, 24.
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Minister of the Interior and to the Minister of Police. It was inevi­
table that the post of the prefect be seen by the various outlying 
provinces as nothing more than a tool for Napoleon's efforts to secure 
his Empire. A letter to Napoleon from the Count of Castellone of 
Languedoc, a region which, like Brittany, had a long tradition of proud 
independence, attests to the transparent use to which Napoleon put his 
prefects and the resentment it caused:
It is true, Sire, that the Prefects make people 
pay their taxes, that they provide you with the 
men to carry on your wars. . . . In a word, the
Prefects are the scullery boys of your glory; 
they prepare the dishes: your generals
eat them.^
The role of the departmental prefect as government agent and police 
informer did not end with Napoleon's exile to St. Helena. The abuse 
actually grew worse as the nineteenth century wore on. But one other 
innovation in French government must be addressed before leaving 
Napoleon: the radical changes he initiated in the educational system.
On March 22, 1800, Napoleon declared that the central schools, 
which had been an attempt on the part of the Constituent Assembly to 
replace the private and religious instruction of the old regime, had 
been a failure. He called for a formal centralization of the school 
system, a mammoth undertaking comparable to the restructuring of the 
Imperial justice and finance systems. Jean Etienne Portalis, a member 
of the Council of Ancients and a close aide to Napoleon, endorsed the
45Ibid., 30.
^6Ibid., 31.
39
First Consul's concern that it was the role of the state, not that of
the Church, to instruct the citizenry on its proper orientation in life.
To his confidant, Louis de Fontanes, a penniless noble who became the
Grand Master of the French University in 1808, Napoleon voiced a more
blatant aim: to make French schools serve as "a soldiers' nursery" for
47the designs of the Empire.
Though many provinces saw an improvement from the shambles of
schools left by the Revolution and its aftermath, Brittany did not.
In the department of the Cotes du Nord, there were forty-one lycee
48instructors in 1804. The number dropped to thirty in 1812. Both
pay and benefits were minimal, and it is not unreasonable to assume
that most of the instructors were less than enthusiastic about the
regions to which they were dispatched. Rarely did the native
instructors remain in their post during the Napoleonic overhaul of the
49educational system. The result was that instruction was given m  
Parisian French, not Breton. Thus little gains were made in the educa­
tional improvement of the general Breton population.
The continued efforts of the Chouan Rebellion, monarchists from 
Brittany and from the Vendee to the south, made the province especially 
suspect throughout the Napoleonic period. Activities of the Chouanerie 
were abated with the return of the monarchy in the reign of
47Godechot, Les institutions de la France, 734. 
Ibid.
49Ibid., 735.
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Louis XVIII.^ But the prefectoral system, as initiated by Napoleon, 
was to keep a tight reign on the provinces throughout the nine­
teenth century.
Brittany's role in French history from 1789 to 1815 was crucial 
yet inconsistent. Still entrenched in a deep feudal tradition, she 
nonetheless initiated some of the earliest revolutionary rhetoric in 
her local parlements. The Club Breton, originally a body of like- 
minded, far-sighted Breton nobility, was the precursor to the foremost 
political organization of the French Revolution, the Jacobin Society. 
Once the Jacobins achieved power, however, the delegates of the Breton 
contingent reverted to a more traditional stance: allegiance to the
monarchy and to the Church. For this allegiance, many nobles and 
priests paid their lives.
The eighteenth century closed with this abrupt about-face in 
Breton affiliation. The province began to symbolize a stronghold of 
Catholicism and political conservatism. This legacy was strengthened 
by Napoleon, who continued the hard-line tradition of keeping the 
provinces in tow with his rigidly administered prefectoral system. 
Thus, the nineteenth century began a long-standing tradition of 
Breton support of a strong centralized State government.
"^Sutherland, The Chouans, 311.
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CHAPTER THREE
Brittany in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries:
From Cultural Renaissance to Political Activista, 1815-1932
The prefectoral system, as created by Napoleon in 1800, was a 
deliberate effort to fragment the provinces of the ancien regime by 
dissecting them into two or more departments. In the case of Brittany, 
the region now consisted of five administrative districts: Cotes du 
Nord, with its seat in the medieval coastal town of Saint Malo; lie et 
Villaine, its seat in the provincial capital of Rennes; Morbihan, the 
rural interior; Finistere, in the extreme western edge of the peninsula, 
with its seat in Brest; and the Loire-Inferieur, to the south, with its 
seat in Nantes.
1
^Jack E. Reece, The Bretons Against France (Chapel Hill: Univer­
sity Press, 1977), ix.
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The result has been much as Napoleon had intended: a loss of a
unified force of regional identity. The prefect, the administrative 
authority who answered to Paris, further distanced himself from the 
historical and geographical identity of the province which he served.
Now more than ever, the departmental prefect of nineteenth century 
France was feared and despised as an agent of the central government.
To understand the somewhat surprising coalition between the 
prefects and those Bretons yearning to be included in the Parisian 
elite, it must be remembered that Brittany, after the Jacobin takeover, 
was solidly royalist. Even the peasantry was largely impatient with 
the radical tenets of the first Constituent Assembly, and staunchly 
supported the return of Louis XVIII to the throne. The Monarchist 
constituency continued in Brittany through the austere reign of 
Charles X (1824-1830), whose reactionary policies provoked the insurrec­
tion of July, 1830. The July revolutionary fervor was, as it had been 
in 1789, predominantly a Parisian class-conscious struggle. The govern­
ment of Charles X was toppled, and a somewhat less conservative Louis 
Philippe assumed the throne. The old aristocracy, as historian John
Buckler described, was left to "retreat to the provinces to sulk harm- 
2
lessly." Meanwhile, corruption at the prefectoral level continued.
The first recorded incident of widely known corruption in the 
Breton prefectoral corps occurred in Morbihan, in 1837. Prefect Lorois 
and his sub-prefect rigged an election in Ploermel for their favorite
Jean Thoraval, Les grandes etapes de la civilisation francaise 
(Paris: Bordas, 1972), 361.
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candidate. Since their selected contender had not been a resident of
Morbihan for the required six months prior to the election, the prefect
and sub-prefect allegedly burned down their own prefectoral office, thus
destroying all records and causing the election to be delayed— exactly 
3
six months. The public, evidently accustomed to such abuses in poli-
4
tical office, did not protest the action.
The prefectoral corps maintained a watchful eye on local notables 
to detect any sign of opposition to state policies. Departmental pre­
fects were usually Parisian natives, or worse, local residents who 
aspired to the position of prefect in order to leave for Paris, using 
their native region as a stepping stone. The people who held this 
office, therefore, often had little interest in the plight of the Breton 
farmer. The first political organization devoted exclusively to Breton 
interests did not come, therefore, from within the ranks of the poli­
tical establishment. Much like the beginnings of the People's Party of 
late nineteenth century in the United States, the first Breton rights 
association began as a farmers' alliance.^
The 1840's in Europe were years of economic hardship and political 
upheaval. The revolt of 1848 which toppled Louis-Philippe and initiated 
the -Second Republic betrayed the same contradictions for Brittany as had 
1789. Though poverty and despair were again afflicting the streets of
3
Brian Chapman, The Prefects and Provincial France (London: George
Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1955), 34.
4
Yanniclc Quin* Histoire de la Bretagne (Paris: Francois Maspero,
1977), 110.
5Ibid., 112.
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Paris, the newly propertied middle class in Brittany, mostly merchants 
and small shopkeepers, was just beginning to prosper.^ A more diversi­
fied economy had begun to replace the strictly agrarian one of the 
eighteenth century, and, overall, the nineteenth century would prove to 
be a period of relative prosperity for most Bretons.7 There were desti­
tute in Brittany, of course, as there were in all regions, but its poor 
were not a political voice as they were in Paris. The truly poor in 
Brittany and other provinces most often headed for Paris to find work 
in the sweatshops, thus swelling the ranks of the Parisian disgruntled
g
and unemployed. The Breton contribution to the revolutions of 1830 
and 1848 was thus indirect, in the form of the displaced, unpropertied 
peasant who joined the urban poor behind the barricades of Paris.
In Brittany the political mood remained reactionary. The Second 
Republic never inspired the ideological rhetoric that the French Revolu­
tion had in Brittany. There was no Club Breton which championed the 
rights of every man, which served as the voice for the forgotten or 
abused. Instead, a coalition of large and small landholders formed a 
fraternity which was fiercely protective of the rights of the propertied 
classes. Alexis de Tocqueville, historian and then representative in 
the second Constituent Assembly, toured Brittany and Normandy in 1849 
and was struck by the peasants’ "universal hatred of radical
6Ibid., 117.
7lbid.
8 *Jean Markale, Histoire secrete de la Bretagne (Paris: Albin
Michel, 1977), 195.
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9
Paris.” The interests in the hearts of Bretons in the mid-nineteenth
century were practical, protective, and decidedly unrevolutionary.
The Association Bretonne was founded in 1843 by Jules Reiffel,
a farmer who had arrived in Brittany in the 1830’s. He had built a
model farm on reclaimed wastelands in the Loire-Inferieur. Originally
founded as a farmers’ support group, the society was declared illegal
in 1858 by a decree of the French government. It would reappear in
1873 as a politically moderate social club for the larger landholders,
stripped of any regionalist nationalism.^
By 1844, however, the Association Bretonne already had become a
viable political force. A bad potato harvest of that year, followed
by an early freeze in the winter of 1845-46, increased the number of
farmers interested in forming a Breton coalition. The following years
were witness to a drought, and a second potato blight wreaked havoc on
the Breton agricultural economy.^^ The Association Bretonne helped
the Breton farmer maintain emotional and social support. Because the
size of the average farm was so small, only a few hectares as opposed
to the numerous acres which made up an American homestead at that
12time, cooperatives as we know them were impractical. The Association
J *Thoraval, Les grandes etapes, 362. My translation.
^Guin, Histoire de la Bretagne, 126.
^Jean Bothorel, La Bretagne contre Paris (Paris: Editions de
la Table Ronde, 1969), 55^
12Gordon Wright, Rural Revolution in France: The Peasantry in
the Twentieth Century (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press,
1964), 15.
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Bretonne, unfortunately, was nearly a century too early to respond to 
the need.
Suzanne Berger, an American political scientist who has traced
the roots of twentieth century Breton revolt in her Peasants Against
Politics, claims that in 1840, only 57 percent of all arable land in
13Brittany was cultivated. Speculation on these lands accelerated in 
the 1840's. The completion of the Nantes-Brest canal in 1850 reduced 
by one-third the cost of transporting produce to urban markets. The 
1850's was perhaps one of the best decades ever in terms of agricultural 
production in Brittany. Such prosperity, however, alarmed the prefec­
toral corps, who, despite its inert political stance, still looked
14askance at the formation of the Association Bretonne.
In 1852, Louis Napoleon, nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte and con­
temptuously referred to by the great Victor Hugo and many others as 
"Napoleon le Petit," was preparing his coup d'etat. He wanted to ele­
vate his status from "President of the Republic" to "Emperor." Under 
his direction, the provincial prefectoral corps quietly and methodically 
created "la peur de 1852," instilling panic in the general French popu­
lation over rebellion in the provinces. Alarmist reports sent back to 
Paris, describing conditions in Brittany and other provinces as revolu­
tionary, created the Red Spectre of 1852. The established bourgeoisie 
of Brittany and other outlying regions was duly frightened, and began
13Suzanne Berger, Peasants Against Politics (Harvard University
Press, 1972), 20. 
14Bothorel, La Bretagne contre Paris, 61.
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to withdraw active support from regional affiliations, including the
• • » 15Association Bretonne.
The reign of Louis Napoleon, who in 1852 took the title Napoleon 
III, marked the resurgence of an assertive, centralized government. 
This renewed spirit of nationalism had a dampening effect on efforts 
toward regional autonomy. Louis Napoleon was politically adept at 
securing the election of his own candidates to the post of deputy.
As the election of the hand-picked delegates was the key to the build­
ing of roads, schools, and the securing ot tax rebates, the Emperor’s 
chosen were destined to re-election. Throughout France, the universal 
male suffrage instituted in 1848 served to solidify a growing con­
servatism, and some historians would venture to say backwardness, in
. 16 the provinces.
The election of Louis Napoleon is often explained by a general 
provincial reaction to the instability of Paris in 1848. The same 
impulse toward conservatism continued to support the Catholic Church 
in Brittany. The peasantry and nobility had long been faithful to 
the traditions of the Church. Now the rising local middle class 
espoused the values of its teachings as well. As a local merchant is 
quoted to have said in the mid-nineteenth century: "There is only
one recipe for making those who own nothing believe in property 
rights: that is to make them believe in God, who, by dictating
15ibid.
16 'Thoraval, Les grandes etapes, 363.
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the Ten Commandments, promises eternal punishment to those
..17who steal.
Both the Church and the aggressive prefectoral corps, who under
/ ^
Napoleon III were described as prefets a poige, or, roughly, ’’crack-
18squad prefects," served to strengthen this conservatism. Described
as haughty, authoritarian, and loaded with honors by the Emperor, the
departmental prefects had become more unscrupulous and more ruthless 
19than ever. Yet Brittany prospered economically in the 1850's 
and I860's.
In 1851, Brittany was still overwhelmingly rural. Its three
largest cities, Nantes, Brest, and Rennes accounted for less than
20seven percent of the province's population. The province’s politics
were primarily conservative, ruled by a faction which historian Jack E.
Reece had labeled the "clerico-aristocratic elite," describing late
nineteenth century Brittany as "a deliberately peasant society, still
21tied to the rectory and the chateau."
Strong central governments, such as that of Napoleon III, often 
experience a period of political dormancy. The luxury of an improving 
economy, such as that which France enjoyed in the mid-nineteenth
^Ibid. My translation.
18Chapman, Prefects, 39.
19Ibid.
20Eugen Weber, Peasants Into Frenchmen: The Modernization of
Rural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1976), 6.
21Reece, The Bretons Against France, 45.
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century, also served to encourage a certain political complacency. This
period, perhaps not coincidentally, also represents the era of a
Romantic Renaissance of Breton folklore and native literature. Never
before had the popular poets and racconteurs been so numerous or so
prolific. The old Celtic songs were sung, and the old Celtic dances
were danced. Breton historian Jean Markale remarks in his Histoire
secrete de la Bretagne that the ignorant and despised regions tend to
22most successfully preserve their unique way of life.
Hessart de' La Villemarque (1815-1895), became the chief promoter
of this Celtic renaissance in literature. In 1873 he published the
Baraz Breiz, a collection of Breton folklore, complete with a codified
glossary of Breton words and their derivations. The resulting work
gained an appreciation, not only for Breton folklore, charm, and song,
but inspired a true following of devotees to Breton literature 
23and tradition.
Brittany shares many legends with the Welsh and the Irish. A 1981
article in Folklore examines the shared myth of the "sunken city" which
24is a common legend in both cultures. The geography of Wales,
Scotland, Ireland, Cornwall, and Brittany encourages a certain air 
of mystery and belief in the unseen. All Celtic cultures have a rich 
heritage of "invisible people": dwarfs, trolls, gnomes, leprochauns,
22 «.Markale, Histoire secrete de la Bretagne (Paris: Albin Michel,
1977), 225.
23Ibid.
24J. Doan, "Legend of the Sunken City in Welsh and Breton Tradi­
tion," Folklore, 92 (June, 1981), 77-83.
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and elves who populate the lakes and forests. Magic potions, often made 
from a secret combination of herbs privy only to a wise old hermit, are 
also a recurring theme.^
The best known Breton literary legacy is the King Arthur legend. 
Much speculation surrounds this claim, as Occitania, the langue d *oc- 
region in the south of France, a region rich in oral tradition, also 
claims to be the birthplace of the legend. Though the troubadours of 
southern France undoubtedly served as the purveyors of Moorish romances 
with similar themes, the King Arthur legends, as we know them, are dis­
tinctly Celtic in character. The most direct precursor is the Romance 
of Tristan and Iseult, an Irish legend which more accurately traces its
roots to Cornwall. Proper names and place names can be pinpointed to
26historical figures and specific locations in Brittany as well.
Tristan et Iseult was first written in Breton in the eleventh century, 
and in French by Chretien de Troyes in the twelfth. Whatever the exact 
date the legend was committed to writing, it is certain that the oral 
tradition long preceded it.
Oral tradition prevails in Brittany, where the Forest of Paimpont 
is said to still be the home of the wizard Merlin. The Druid ruins of 
Carnac still stand ominously by the sea to the south, some extending 
hauntingly into a neighboring farmer’s field. Garlic, mistletoe, and 
oak trees still have supernatural powers, according to local lore.
25The hermit also plays a significant role in the original Tristan 
et Iseult.
26 %Markale, Histoire secrete de la Bretagne, 91. See also footnote
18, Chapter I.
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Though a discussion of folklore and twelfth century legends may seem a 
digression in a treatment of nineteenth century Brittany, it was this 
very mystique and intrigue that made the province so enticing to her
V
Romantic contemporaries. It might be noted that a recently published
history of Brittany devotes two hundred of its two hundred and fifty
pages to Celtic tradition, covering post-1789 Brittany in the scant 
27remaining pages. As for Breton oral tradition, this same author
begins his work with a Breton phrase: Piu e^ zo kriv er hoalh er bed
eit cherrin beg en Vretoned? Translated roughly, "Who could possibly
28silence the throats of the Bretons?"
Rene de Chateaubriand (1768-1848), was a noted proponent of the
great Romantic literary tradition. The tenth child of a Breton noble-
man, Chateaubriand was born in Saint Malo, on a night of a howling 
29tempest. He grew up in a grim, solitary, castle on the stormy Breton 
northern coast. His closest companion was his sister Lucille, frail, 
excessively emotional, and allegedly gifted with psychic powers. 
Chateaubriand, not surprisingly, had a tormented childhood and attempted 
suicide at least once during his adolescence. He made popular what came 
to be called the mal du siecle, or "sickness of the century," which 
described the excesses of a romantic disposition', especially as it 
afflicted sensitive, tormented young men in the mid-1800's. It became
27T u - aIbid.
28Ibid., vii. My translation.
29Andre Lagarde and Laurent Mechard, Les grands auteurs francais 
du XIXe siecle (Paris: Bordas, 1969), 28.
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fashionable to "confront the world with loathing and despair, to patrol
lonely cliffs on stormy midnights, to be at the same time a misanthropic
30hermit and a volcano of passion." The writings of Chateaubriand,
La Vie au Chateau de Combourg and the autobiographical Rene, have 
greatly contributed to the image of Brittany as a stormy, romantic, and 
mysterious province.
There was such a resiliency of Breton tradition in the mid­
nineteenth century that Napoleon III, on a visit to Pontivy in rural 
Brittany in 1858, gave his address in broken Breton! It may well have 
been the only era, short-lived as it was, in which Breton was actually 
learned by a number of cultivated and literary Frenchmen as a second 
language. The city fathers of Pontivy were so impressed by the
31Emperor's gesture that they briefly renamed the town, Napoleonville.
But the disastrous Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 soon dampened this 
"era of good feeling."
The Prussian armies surrounded Paris in January, 1871. Louis- 
Napoleon abdicated and the Third Republic began. Though the Bretons 
helped, futilely, to stave off the Prussians as they advanced on Paris, 
it was the poor of Paris, once again, who suffered most from the seige. 
Living off rats and zoo animals until they were literally starved into 
submission, the Parisian population had paid dearly for the glory of 
France. When national elections that Spring sent a majority of con­
servatives and monarchists to the National Assembly, traumatized
Ibid. My translation.
31Guin, Histoire de la Bretagne, 91.
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Parisians exploded and proclaimed the Second Commune. The Assembly 
ordered the French army into Paris and brutally crushed the communards, 
killing 20,000. As in 1848,.a radicalized Paris fought against the 
staid, conservative countryside.
One positive political legacy of the Third Republic was the
weakened role of the prefect. No longer subject to a permanent,
authoritative head of state but to frequently changing Ministers of
the Interior, the prefectoral corps began to lack the continuity of
purpose and spiraling prestige that it had enjoyed during the Second
Empire. Aging and docile Adolphe Thiers, first president of the Third
Republic, tried to instill a sense of national unity by maintaining a
republic of a moderately conservative stance. This would be, he said
32cautiously in 1875, "the government which divides us least."
Under the leadership of Jules Ferry (1879-1886) a degree of poli­
tical autonomy for the provinces was granted in the direct election of 
mayors. On March 28, 1882, the mayors of the county seats were no 
longer appointed by the Ministers of the Interior but elected directly 
by the voters. On April 5, 1884, the municipal councils were also 
elected directly. The 1880’s saw much improvement in the providing of 
social services in the provinces. Roads, bridges, and public meeting 
places now were better funded and better maintained. A series of laws 
passed between 1879 and 1886 established free, compulsory, co-educational 
schooling. The tax-supported state school system began to undermine the
^Thoraval, Les grandes etapes, 289. My translation.
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role of the parochial education, though Church-run schools continued to
33outnumber those of the State.
Encouraging as these improvements of the late nineteenth century 
appear, underlying them was a growing effort on the part of the state 
administration to nationalize, consolidate, and downplay regional dif­
ferences. Perhaps more important, though less tangible, was the general 
public's growing distaste for the seeming backwardness of Brittany.
What had been heralded a little more than a generation earlier as roman­
tic, mystical, and captivating now was chided as ignorant, slovenly, and 
repugnant. One explanation for this sudden change of mind was that it 
was no longer the erudite who was interested in Brittany, but the middle- 
class tourist. The rugged beaches and untamed forests of Brittany were 
"discovered" by the French en masse, it seemed, in the 1890's. Void of 
literary or historical appreciation of the Celtic race, much misunder­
standing, indeed, true maliciousness, was directed toward the Breton 
race. One minor example is a song still sung, though not by Bretons, 
titled "Ils portent des chapeaux ronds, vive les Bretons!" The phrase 
roughly translated is "Long live the round-capped Bretons." The tradi­
tional Breton cap has never been round, but the adjective in French 
conveniently rhymes with the second syllable of Breton, as do the vulgar 
references of the ensuing verses.^
33 /Jacques Godechot, La contre-revolution: doctrine et action,
1789-1904 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968), 281.
34Personal observation, Rennes, Brittany, June, 1973.
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Adding injury to insult, the 1890's was a decade of economic hard­
ship and agricultural decline. The farm economy in Brittany was still 
very much a small family operation. Plots of land were scattered piece­
meal, a legacy of seigneural allotments. Records show that in 1882 the
department of Finistere was divided into more than 1,500,000 enclosed
35
pastures. The average size of each parcel was less than an acre. By 
1900 the once touted Nantes-Brest canal had fallen into neglect and dis­
repair. The ensuing poverty evidently proved unsightly to the vacation­
ing Parisians, and the expression "sales Bretons," or "dirty Bretons,"
36became a euphemism. Even harsher expressions were heard, such as
37"the potatoes are for the pigs, the peels are for the Bretons."
In 1898 the Union Regionaliste Bretonne (URB) was founded by an
aging aristocrat, the Marquis Regis de 11EstourbeilIon of Vannes. The
38URB was conservative, pro-Catholic, and isolationist. It served to 
consolidate a growing anti-Parisian sentiment in the province. Its 
membership comprised a growing number of the new middle class, who was 
rapidly replacing both the peasant and the nobility as the force behind 
the Breton autonomy movement. The agenda for these newly prospering 
Bretons, among whom numbered many landholders, merchants, and a growing 
professional class, was to maintain a stable mercantile economy, while 
preserving a degree of economic autonomy from Paris. Efforts to
35Berger, Peasants, 17.
36Personal observation, Rennes, Brittany, June, 1973.
37Markale, Histoire, 229. My translation.
38Guin, Histoire de la Bretagne, 127.
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preserve a measure of cultural autonomy followed, especially as the late 
nineteenth century professed a renewed sense of nationalism, and the
French State subsequently consolidated its efforts to discourage
, . 39regxonal expressxon.
The growing alienation of Brittany from the rest of France was
perhaps a necessary backdrop for the more forceful autonomist efforts
of the early twentieth century. Successive anti-regionalist legislation
at the turn of the century helped to consolidate Breton resistance.
A decree of July 1, 1901, designed to consolidate central control in
the Third Republic, prohibited all Breton associations from official
existence. The newly reformed Association Bretonne was again forced 
40underground. On September 29, 1902, a law passed by the National
Assembly prohibited the use of Breton at Mass in Breton churches. Said
the Minister of the Interior, Emile Combes, in ratifying this law:
41"Bretons will be republicans only when they speak French." Official
separation of Church and State was solidified in France by a decree of
42December 12, 1905. This law served only to recruit the Church in 
Brittany into the growing Breton movement, since many of the local cures 
spoke only broken French.
39Ibid., 157.
40Bothorel, La Bretagne contre Paris (Paris: Editions de la
Table Ronde, 1969), 87.
41Berger, Peasants, 72.
42Ibid., 49.
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The Breton Church schools also represented a continued resistance
to the state school system. In the fossilized Breton village of the
early twentieth century, the first person to represent social progress
was the school master. Often anti-clerical and left-wing politically,
he tended to identify progress with all things French and regression
with all that were Breton. Gone was the former romantic appreciation
for the "Breton mystique." The Minister of Public Instruction expressed
this growing hostility when he declared in 1910 that:
Federalism and superstition speak Breton; 
fanaticism speaks Basque. We must shatter 
these instruments of damage and error. . . .
It is not our obligation to preserve the 
barbaric jargon and grotesque idioms which 
only serve to spread reactionary fanatics.
The parallel between the Basque and Breton separatists, though 
certainly the topic of a separate discussion, is a useful comparison. 
Both provinces are of a distinct stock of people who speak a distinct 
language, not just a dialect as is spoken in Provence or Alsace. Both 
regions were brought quite late into the French State. The Basques even 
found themselves at war with France after its annexation in the efforts 
of Louis IX and Pope Innocent III to purge the region of the Cathar 
heresy. Both provinces have periodically exerted autonomist activities 
well into the twentieth century. And both regions are predominantly 
rural. Even the contemporary protests speak to farm issues such as 
the milk wars in Brittany in 1972 and the wine boycott in the Basque 
country in 1975. The 1912 slogan: "Unir tous ceux que la terre
43Markale, Histoire, 232. My translation.
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fait vivre," or "Unite all those who live off the land," would serve as
44a timeless rallying call of opposition to Paris.
Breton nationalism was further evidenced by the founding of the
45Parti Nationaliste Breton (PNB), in 1911. This society formed in 
response to the previously mentioned statue of a supplicant Anne of 
Brittany, which was presented by the French government to the city of 
Rennes to commemorate the four hundred year anniversary of Brittany’s 
annexation. The PNB regularly invoked the 1532 Treaty of Plessex and 
and published its own manifesto which cited a litany of transgressions 
which it claimed the central government had committed against Brittany's 
regional integrity. It was the first autonomist group to claim a 
majority of professionals, including lawyers and university professors, 
among its membership.^
A number of regionalist publications began circulating in the pre­
war years. The PNB published Breiz Dishual (Breton for "Free Brittany"), 
the most radical in that all the text was written in Breton, not French, 
and so enlivened the debate over the significance of a Breton national­
ist's ability to speak his ancestral tongue. ^  A faction which believed 
fluency in Breton was not essential to the Breton cause published, in
44Ibid., 165.
45David H. Fortier, "Brittany: Breiz Atao," Nations Without A
State, Charles R. Foster, ed. (New York: Praeger Publishing,
1981), 144.
46Ibid.
47Ibid.
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French, Brittia, which stressed the Celtic heritage and proud history of 
48the Breton race. A third publication, Brug ("Heather"), was the first
49
Breton review with an openly socialist political stance. The circula­
tion of all three periodicals was less than five hundred, and all ended
abruptly with the outbreak of World War I.^
Brittany did rally for the nationalist effort to defend all of 
France in the First World War. Like the rest of the nation, she lost 
many of her brightest and best in the Great War, the "War to End All 
Wars." Though contested, Breton historians have claimed that the pro­
portion of Breton soldiers killed in World War I was much higher than
any other French population. Much like the claim that some American 
minorities made during the Vietnam War, Bretons claim that they were 
assigned the front lines at a disproportionate rate. Brittany did 
suffer a high mortality rate in the war: twelve percent of all
Bretons mobilized. ^
In 1919 a declaration presented by the Breton bishopric re-invoked
the Treaty of 1532 which declared that Bretons were not obliged to serve
52in a military capacity outside their own borders. The URB, still 
under the leadership of the Marquis d ’Estourbeillon, sent an appeal to 
Woodrow Wilson in 1919, pleading for the then forming League of Nations
48Markale, Histoire secrete, 116.
49Ibid.
50.,.,Ibid.
^Guin, Histoire de la Bretagne, 187.
52 *Markale, Histoire secrete, 231.
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to recognize Breton autonomy. The plea was politely acknowledged in a
letter sent to Estourbeillon by Wilson, but no further reference to
53Brittany was every made by the international organization.
The French government was not particularly receptive to such 
gestures toward its western extreme, when the country was just recover­
ing from the atrocities of trench warfare that had afflicted its east­
ern border with Germany. The ominous world picture and ensuing econo­
mic depression encouraged centralized authority, and it came in the 
person of Georges Clemenceau. As Minister of the Interior during World 
War I, Clemenceau made use of the Prefectoral Corps to serve as imple­
mentors of his own policies. Departmental prefects intervened in many 
fields of social and economic life, including price-fixing, and often
i * 54unscrupulous invasions of prxvacy.
Immediately after the war, intellectual and political commitment 
to self-determination in Brittany was at an all-time high. Publication 
of a highly articulate and prophetic journal, the Breiz Atao ("Brittany 
Above All"), began in 1918. Read today, the early copies of Breiz Atao 
are prophetic in their anticipation of future political stands, pro­
fessing the desirability of federal Europe with greater freedom for 
minorities under its aegis. For example, one issue warned of "the 
threat to the working class of ever enlarging industrial trusts acting
53Guin, Histoire de la Bretagne, 202.
54 ^Michel Phlipponneau, La Gauche et les regions (Paris: Colmann-
Levy, 1967), 22.
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in collusion with a centralized nation-state. The sponsoring organi­
zation of Breiz Atao was the Parti National Breton.
Originally calling itself the Groupe Regionaliste Breton (GRB), 
this group was founded in 1919 by two teenagers: Maurice Marchal, then
aged eighteen, and Olivier Mordrel, then aged fourteen. A third member 
made up the original leadership of the GRB, Franche Debauvais, an avowed 
separatist who professed his admiration for the Irish independence move­
ment, and who had witnessed the bloody protest in Dublin of Easter Week, 
1 9 1 6 . All three leaders, though passionately Breton nationalists, 
were predominantly French-speaking. This left open to debate, once 
again, what linguistic stance the Breton autonomy movement should 
uphold. A new vocabulary punctuated their regionalist discussions: 
Bretonnants, referring to Breton-speaking natives, and Gallos, franco­
phones who nevertheless-professed Breton autonomy. ^  Marchal, a Gallo, 
addressed the profound marginality felt by those French-speaking Bretons 
who lived in the eastern section of the province (closer to Paris), and 
who felt more threatened by Parisian encroachment, be it economic, cul­
tural, or political, than did their fellow Bretons in the more remote
58department of Finistere.
"^Olivier Mordrel, Briez Atao ou Histoire et actualite du 
nationalisme breton (Paris: Editions Atair Moreau, 1973), 22.
^8A detailed account of the Dublin protest is William Irwin 
Thomas’ The Imagination of an Insurrection (New York: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1967).
57Reece, Bretons Against France, 92.
58Ibid., 93.
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By 1921 there were five hundred regular subscribers to Breiz 
59Atao. The GRB was rapidly alienating the less politically radical
regionalist groups. The Blen-Brug, whose founder was the much respected
Abbe Perrot, a cleric who was to be martyred for his regionalist beliefs
near the end of World War II, was regularly chided by the GRB leadership
as being a ’’merchant of gallicization. The rhetoric of Marchal,
Mordrel, and Debauvais became progressively more radical, as they
accused all Bretons not wholly committed to their cause as being "half
61French in blood, values, and conduct." In 1925 an editorial in the
Breiz Atao called for an immigration of true Celtic blood from Scotland,
62Ireland, and Wales to bolster the wavering Breton population. In 
keeping with its historical emphasis, the GRB tended to stress the 
historical impetus for Celtic solidarity, whereas other organizations 
preferred to consolidate around the Breton language. A separate publi­
cation satisfied this second impulse, by issuing a quarterly journal, 
in Breton, called Gwalarn ("Northwesterner"). Devoted to Breton litera­
ture, this publication outlived Breiz Atao, lasting nearly twenty-five
63years, until its last issue in 1944.
In 1928 Maurice Duhamel, a renowned French music critic, lent his 
name to the regionalist cause. He voiced his consternation over what
59
Ibid., 96.
60ibid.
61Ibld., 97.
62Ibid.
63Ibid., 98.
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he perceived as the French government's gross mishandling of the Alsace
autonomy movement. Convinced that the budding separatist movement in
Alsace would serve as a rallying point of solidarity for other such
regional efforts, Duhamel, Mordrel, and Marchal made a symbolic show of
64support by attending the trial of the Alsacian separatist leaders.
In August of that year the group changed its name to the Parti
Autonomiste Breton (PAB). And on August 17, the Alsacian leadership
was found guilty of sedition and alleged acceptance of German subsi- 
6 5dies. By association, the Breton movement also came under the close
scrutiny of the French Government. By 1929 the sale of Breiz Atao was
66prohibited in French train stations and army barracks.
Ironically, the man who convinced the Breton leadership to align
itself with the Alsacian crusade himself resigned the PAB a few months
later. Accused of holding the cause of "international federalism"
above that of Brittany, the Duhamel resignation sparked yet another
debate within the Breton leadership: Was a federalist stance, which
supported the regional integrity of a variety of ethnic groups,
6 7ineffective in its ability to champion the Breton cause? The debate 
was cut short by the international financial crisis of 1929. Both 
Mordrel and Debauvais resigned from the PAB in April, 1930. The 1930's
64
Fortier, "Brittany: Breiz Atao," Nations Without A State, 145.
65Ibid., 146.
66Reece, Bretons Against France, 108.
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would see a period of frustration and tumult which left some of the more 
radical elements of Breton activists open to flirtation with Nazi 
Germany. On the other hand, the French Communists never made more of a 
showing in Brittany than the limited industry within the province could 
support. Union membership was generally low in Brittany until after
68World War II, and there was not a highly visible Communist presence.
In 1932 a radical element of the former PNB formed the Gwenn Ha
Du, Breton for "Black and White," the colors of the Breton flag. It was
the Gwenn Ha Du, that, under the leadership of the extremist Celestin 
✓
Laine, spearheaded some of the more colorful protest movements of the 
1930's. Gwenn Ha Du claimed credit for the derailing of Parisian digni­
taries on their way to Breton rallies. Youthful members of the Gwenn 
H£ Du had been responsible, a decade earlier, for toppling the statue
of Anne of Brittany paying homage to Louis XII of France. But Celestin 
✓
Laine grew to be a bit too extreme for his own political survival. His 
campaign to bring a return to the ancient practices of the Druids, and, 
later, charges of collaboration with Nazi Germany, led to his exile to 
Ireland in 1943.^
A less menacing association, yet just as subversive in the eyes of 
Parisian officials, was the Emgleo Belein Breizh (1911-1958), a Breton 
support group whose spokespersons were the local Catholic priests.^
A branch of the so-called progressive wing of the Church, the main
68Phlipponneau, La Gauche et les regions, 92.
^Markale, Histoire secrete, 234.
^Bothorel, La Bretagne, 89.
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cause celebre of this overwhelmingly rural constituency was to allow,
educate, and encourage the use of the Breton language in and throughout
the region. The priests also championed the plight of the region's
/I !unemployed, as unemployment was at crisis levels. :
Economic depression and political instability contributed to a 
renewed activism in Brittany. Growing political activism was the legacy 
of economic instability in much of western Europe in the 1930's. The 
1940's would see dramatic, though ill-conceived efforts toward Breton 
secession in the volatile turmoil of World War II. The 1950's would 
foster a positive, though not always successful, program of government- 
sponsored alternatives to the overly centralized Parisian administration.
The Breton cultural revival of the mid-nineteenth century was 
short-lived. It soon disappeared and revealed a hard core of abuse 
and exploitation by a zealous prefectoral corps that spanned the reign 
of Napoleon III, relieved somewhat during the Second Republic, but 
reasserted itself during World War I. A brief renaissance of the 
literature and folk legends of Brittany began in the mid-nineteenth 
century, reaching its peak with the writings of the Bretons Villemarque 
and Chateaubriand. But the lore of Brittany became the target of 
scorn and repulsion to the Parisian vacationers by the end of 
the century.
The early twentieth century saw distinctly increased activism in 
Brittany. Movements to restore the Breton language to the schools and 
churches met with forceful opposition, however, by the French state.
71Ibid.
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World War I and the subsequent economic depression served to further 
consolidate Breton resistance efforts, making the 1920Ts and 1930’s very 
significant decades in the history of Breton autonomy. A second World 
War was to thwart the focus of Breton concerns, however, ushering in 
the most controversial period of Breton autonomist efforts: Breton
collaboration with Nazi Germany.
67
CHAPTER FOUR
Political Extremism and Economic Reform:
1932-1967
Braced by a dire economic situation, and bolstered by the renewed 
efforts of the Parti National Breton (PNB), and the Emglio Belein 
Breizh, Breton activism took a bold, and what history would later 
judge reckless, turn on the eve of World War II. Two extremists were 
at the head: Franche Debeauvais and Olivier Mordrel. The latter has
already been cited in this treatment as the author of a comprehensive 
history of the Breiz Atao movement. He also wrote, in 1937, L 1 Essence 
de la Bretagne, or "The Essence of Brittany." This essay reveals the 
bitterness and defiance these Breton extremists felt about contributing 
to the French war effort.
Mordrel asserted that the history of Brittany was alive, and 
objected to the quaint depiction of the Breton story as told by the 
museum guides. He charged: "They’ve made Brittany a mannequin with
no brain. They’ve killed her saints, and replaced them with ones no 
one recognizes, just as they had done in Scotland and Wales.
^Olivier Mordrel, L'Essence de la Bretagne (Finistere: Kelenn,
1977), 66.
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Breiz Atao publications, many of them on file in the National
Archives, reveal this same disenchantment with France. Even the
earliest issues expressed a growing resentment of Parisian authority.
The Paris government, one issue stated, "has not respected our soil,
our language, and our traditions." The tone grew more hostile as a
following issue charged that Bretons "were confronted by a moral
struggle to the death between two races and two civilizations: Latins
2
against Celts." A 1938 publication charged that "Bretons were once
3
free; now they are the slaves of France." A publication a year later
encouraged Breton youth to resist the draft, with lyrics to a song that
asked what possible motivation could they have to supply hated France 
4
with soldiers?
Mordrel and Debauvais saw, in the French-German conflict, a chance 
for Brittany to take advantage of a weakened French State. Breton his­
torians are apologetic for the naivete of these aspirations toward 
Breton autonomy under Nazi-controlled France. And one Breton author even 
insists that he still hears frustration and regret expressed over the 
lost opportunity to be free of the French administrative stranglehold, 
and the belief that Brittany should have tried its luck under the Nazi 
regime."* Mordrel, Debauvais, and Celestin Laine all went into exile
2
Jack E. Reece, The Bretons Against France (Chapel Hill: Univer­
sity Press, 1977), 92.
3
Breiz Atao, February 9, 1928, Archives Nationales de France, 
file F7 13244.
^Ibid., March 28, 1939.
"*Jean Markale, Histoire secrete de la Bretagne (Paris: Editions
Albin Michel, 1977), 233.
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in Ireland and Wales in the middle of World War II, as the French
Resistance gained in strength.^
A more dramatic, though less substantiated, accusation was the 
collaboration of the Breton Church with Nazi Germany during World 
War II. It became known as 1’Affaire de l’abbe Perrot. Jean-Marie 
Perrot was one of the founders of the Bleun-Brug, a long-established 
Catholic cultural society in Brittany that had no affiliation whatsoever 
with the Nazi Party. The society was admittedly right-wing in its mem­
bership, as were most Breton organizations since 1789. Abbe Perrot was 
outspoken in his abhorrence of the war. His lack of enthusiasm for the 
French war effort was evidently interpreted by some as collaboration.
As a consequence, he was shot and killed by a militant Communist member
of the Resistance on December 12, 1943.7
Meanwhile, the 1930’s was a particularly active period for Breton
activists. The statue of the supplicant Anne of Brittany in front of 
the municipal building in Rennes was bombed for a second time on 
August 7, 1932. Debauvais and several other former PNB members were 
arrested. On November 20, the train of the visiting French Premier, 
Edouard Herriot, was derailed. The Gwenn Ha Du claimed responsibility. 
The Gwenn Ha Du marks the second time that, the Breton autonomist move­
ment can be linked directly to the Irish nationalists. Its director,
Yannick Guin, L ’Histoire de la Bretagne (Paris: Francais
Maspero, 1977), 221.
7Ibid., 219.
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Celestin Laine, modeled the organization on the Irish Senn Fein, whose
g
secret society he had admired during his visits to Ireland.
By 1933 the most extreme elements of the Breton nationalist move­
ment were strikingly similar to the patterns of Nazi Germany. Breton 
youth clubs were created to foster a "nativist versus foreigner" dicho­
tomy. Mordrel published an editorial in which he urged amnesty for the
Germans in World War I, and a cancellation of all German repara- 
9tion payments.
On Easter of 1936, the Gwenn Ha Du claimed responsibility for the 
bombing of prefecture offices in Nantes, Rennes, Quimper, and Saint- 
Brieuc. While the PNB denounced these acts, others in the politically 
extremist factions of Breton nationalism, including Celestin Laine, 
were growing more and more vocal in their support for a potential Nazi 
collaboration. Laine organized a paramilitary patrol in Finistere which 
took the name of Services Speciales, and even donned the symbol of the 
swastika. Laine was cited for sedition and jailed in May of 1938, but 
released the following year.^ Debauvais and Mordrel were also 
arrested, and subsequently fled to Belgium days before the Nazi-Soviet 
pact was revealed. Ironically, the freed extremist Celestin Laine was 
again at the helm of the Breton PNB on the brink of World War 11.^
8Ibid., 210.
9Reece, The Bretons Against France, 135.
1QIbid., 145-47.
U Ibid. , 147.
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Paris prohibited any further meetings of the PNB and ruled on an
indefinite suspension of the Breiz Atao publication. In February, 1940,
Mordrel and Debauvais fled to Berlin and were sentenced, in absentia, to
five years in prison on charges of insubordination in time of war.
Meanwhile, most of Brittany was mobilizing for the war effort, sending
more men to the Front than any other region. Once again, Brittany lost
12the largest proportion of men mobilized.
Laine was sentenced to five years in prison in February, 1940, but
was released in 1943 and returned to his native Finistere. Incredibly,
he continued to conduct paramilitary training for Breton youth. Already
by 1942, however, there was a considerable scramble among the more
moderate Breton activists to form alternative regional organizations
/
which would not be linked to the Nazi effort as was Laine's PNB. Most 
of these eleventh hour efforts did little good. By 1943 a number of 
the editors of even the purely literary quarterlies, if published in
Breton, were killed by angry mobs of resisters. There were fifteen such
13 /deaths recorded in 1943. At the end of that year, the Abbe Perrot,
respected founder of the leading Catholic Breton society, was murdered
by a young resistant. Laine formed the Bezenn Perrot ("Perrot Society")
in the dead priest's honor, and tightened his collaboration with
Nazi Germany.^
12Guin, L'histoire de la Bretagne, 246.
13David H. Fortier, "Brittany: 'Breiz Atao,"' Nations Without
A State, Charles R. Foster, ed. (New York: Praeger Publishing,
1980), 146.
1 4 t T • 1Ibid.
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Meanwhile Debauvais, who had fled to Alsace in 1943, died there 
the following year. Mordrel, charged with treason by the French govern­
ment after the Liberation, was sentenced to death. He went into exile
(
in South America and remained there for twenty years. He returned to 
Brittany in the late 1960Ts, and wrote a revised edition of his 1937 
L'Essence de la Bretagne, claiming very little had changed for the 
better in the past forty years in B r i t t a n y . I n  the summer of 1944 
at least thirty nationalists were tried and executed in Brittany. 
Hundreds of others fled to Germany, Ireland, and the United States, or 
joined Mordrel in South America.^
Though most of the membership of the Bezenn Perrot was granted 
amnesty after the war, some were killed by jubilant members of the 
Resistance during Liberation celebrations. Many fled to Ireland. 
Celestin Laine, now dying of tuberculosis, died in Alsace, en route 
to a sad reunion with fellow Nazi sympathizers.^7
Very few Bretons were registered members of the Bezenn Perrot.
The overwhelming majority had no collaborator leanings; indeed, most 
Bretons concerted their efforts to negate the province's reputation 
as a Nazi stronghold and contributed the highest per capita percentage 
of fighting men to the French war effort. One out of four Breton men
^Mordrel, L'Essence de la Bretagne, 65.
16t, . ,Ibid.
17Ibid., 238.
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were lost in the war, as compared to the national average of one out
* * 18 of eight.
Yet the image of Brittany as soft on Nazis has persisted. After 
the War, it was sufficient cause for arrest and investigation if one 
possessed any literature written in Breton. Even the present-day 
symbol of Brittany, a black and white circle with the insignia BZH, 
abbreviation for Breizh, the Breton word for Brittany, underwent
scrutiny to determine that it was not a coded reference to sedi-
. . .  19tious activities.
The immediate post World War II years were, consequently, far
more subdued in regard to regional reform. The few clubs that met
in the late 1940’s were not vehicles of autonomy, but rather, cultural
clubs, bent on preserving the Breton dances and songs of their Celtic
tradition. Such cercles celtiques were not new. The first Inter-
Celtic Congress, a federation of devotees from Wales, Ireland, Brittany,
and Scotland, had met in Saint-Brieuc, Brittany, in 1867. Though
autonomy might have been discussed informally among the members, the
expressed intention of the associations was to preserve and practice
20Celtic traditions within one’s respective country.
In terms of music and dance, such organizations were very success­
ful. The Vichy government had complied with the more moderate efforts
18Bothorel, La Bretagne Contre Paris (Paris: Editions de la
Table Ronde, 1969), 121.
19Markale, Histoire secrete de la Bretagne, 235-36.
20Renaud Dulong, La question bretonne (Paris: Fondation Nationale
des sciences politiques, 1975), 25.
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toward regional preservation. It created, on October 12, 1942, a Comite 
Consultatif de Bretagne. Its list of moderate proposals included the 
teaching of Breton history in the Breton schools, and the lifting of 
the prohibition against instruction in the Breton language. Its presi­
dent, Yann de Guebriant, was arrested after the war on charges of
21collaboration and went into exile.
Historian Jack E. Reece claims that from 1944 to 1947, a concerted 
effort was made by the French government to purge Brittany once and 
for all of its nationalist sympathizers. The extent of this govern­
ment effort will not be known until the documents of the period are 
22made public.
The prefectoral system was undermined by the turmoil and suspicion
of authority which characterized the Vichy regime. Though the prefects
had been given extraordinary powers, such as administering rations,
orchestrating evacuation if necessary, and all powers necessary to
maintain public order, their unquestioned authority came to an abrupt
halt after the Liberation. All Vichy prefects were replaced, leaving
an enormous administrative vacuum to contend with the post-war
23economic depression.
Quietly and behind-the-scenes, a regional reform movement in 
Brittany did get underway. Begun in 1949, and still active today, the
21Ibid.
22Jack E. Reece, The Bretons Against France, 171.
23Robert 0. Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-
1944 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 376.
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Comite d 'Etude et de Liaison des Interets Bretons (CELIB), or "Committee 
to Study Breton Interests," was the first of its kind. Its founder was 
Joseph Martray, editor of a post World War II quarterly called LePeuple 
Breton. Martray determined that Brittany's ills were primarily eco­
nomic. Anticipating the tenets of the "periphery theory" of economic
development, Martray organized a meeting of influential Breton business-
24men and economic theorists. Its tone was apolitical. The CELIB was
actually a think tank, composed of professors of economics, geography,
and political science. Its first president, Rene Plevon, an astute
organizer who also served as the liaison to Paris, held office from
1949 to 1972. The intentions of the CELIB were to respond to the
25unaddressed, yet vital, needs of post-war Brittany.
Though Brittany did not suffer the devastation of Alsace-Lorraine 
or of parts of her neighbor to the north, Normandy, both Nantes and 
Brest were bombed in the fighting. Overall, however, the trouble with 
Brittany after the war was a generalized low esteem, a stymied economy, 
and an increasing likelihood of being left out of State sponsored reju­
venation programs. The CELIB is to be credited for its early anticipa­
tion of such problems and its clearness of purpose in addressing them.
According to its own publication, a yearly review of its programs 
and perceived areas of concern, the CELIB supported the following 
measures in the 1950's:
The term was widely used after the publication of Sidney 
Tarrow's Between Center and Periphery: Grassroots Politicians in Italy
and France (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).
25Ibid., 93.
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1) a viable and stable economic base in 
the province
2) a growing political assertiveness on 
the part of Breton interest groups
3) the preservation of the Breton language 
and other manifestations of its culture
4) increased responsiveness on the part of
the Parisian bureaucracy to these
9  fsexpressed needs^°
Because other groups such as the cercles celtiques had championed the
third cause listed, the following discussion of the CELIB will limit
itself to the group’s commitment to the three new areas of concern.
In 1952, the CELIB developed the First Breton Plan, a regional
reform program which was the first of its kind in France. It devoted
itself to a ten-year effort to restore a vibrant, more self-sustaining
economy to post-war Brittany. Its primary goal was to decentralize
industry in France in order to allow the provinces as a whole— and of
course, Brittany in particular— to benefit from the job market and local
investment that regional industry would provide. In a 1953 report
entitled Rapport d ’ensemble sur un plan d ’amenagement de modernisation
et d ’equipement de la Bretagne, optimistic projections were made con-
27cerning Brittany’s economic potential.
France prospered in the 1950’s. Regionalists initially found a
source of encouragement in the coming to power of Charles De Gaulle in 
281958. He claimed, in his appeal to the grandeur and uniqueness of
2 6 * * ^Comite d ’etude et de liaison des interets bretons (Rennes:
Presses Universitaires, 1971), 12.
27TU.,Ibid.
28 %
Michel Phlipponneau, Le Probleme breton et la programme d'action
regionale (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1957), 22.
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France, to be the protector of her diverse and endangered heritage. But 
it soon became apparent that there was little to back up his eloquence. 
Breton disillusionment with his campaign promises came to a head in 
1961, with typical Breton flair for the public humiliating of Parisian 
envoys, in the town of Quimper, in the highly region-conscious depart­
ment of Finistere. The conflict between De Gaulle and the regionalists
became so impassioned that government security staff were ordered to
29stifle the microphones.
Not content with the slow pace of advances made by the CELIB,
several splinter groups formed in an effort to appeal to the less
patient. The first was the Mouvement pour 1'Organisation de la
Bretagne, or (MOB). It was established in 1956 by Yann Fouere, an
aging Breton activist and former PNB member who came out of a self-
imposed exile to found the organization. Its key issue was a return of
the right to speak Breton in the schools and churches, which in the
301950's was still prohibited by an early twentieth century law.
The late 1950's and early 1960's were active years for Breton 
regional reform. A decree of December, 1958, sponsored by Pierre 
Mendes-France, Socialist opposition candidate to Charles De Gaulle and 
a politician with considerable national renown, provided for a return 
to the regional boundaries of the ancien provinces. This redefinition 
of the provincial map of France would consolidate the ninety-six depart­
ments to the sixteen original regions. The peninsula of Brittany would
29Ibid.
30Markale, Histoire secrete, 231.
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thus be simply la_ Bretagne, rather than the five departments into which 
Napoleon had sliced it in 1800. This piece of legislation, however, 
underwent many modifications. In January, 1959, the law was amended to
/■ f
retain the administrative unit of department, as previously established, 
but to acknowledge as well the political entity of the region. The law 
underwent further revisions, in June, 1960; in March, 1964; in July, 
1972; and again in March, 1982. Such revisions were necessary as a 
means of updating French territorial losses, in Algeria, Catalonia, 
and elsewhere.^
The present count of French administrative units numbers, from the
smallest to the largest, 3,530 cantons, 320 arrondissements, ninety-six
32departments, and twenty-two regions. There is no precise equivalent
in the United States system of government to this French pyramid of
command. It has come to be known, spitefully, as la tutelle. La
tutelle, meaning literally "harness," is a bureaucratic quagmire of
decision-making, rendering precise actions in response to precise
regional needs nearly impossible. The system has been termed a
"maladjustment which is technical, financial, geographical,
33and administrative."
31Nations Without A State, Charles R. Foster, editor.
32Jacque Legroye and Vincent Wright, eds., Local Government in 
Britain and France: Problems and Prospects, text from a meeting of
the Institut d'etudes politiques in Bordeaux in May, 1975 and in 
Paris, 1977.
33J. C. Thoenig, "Local Government Institutions and Contemporary 
Evolution of French Society," Local Government in Britain and France, 76.
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The CELIB hastily set up a series of committees in the mid-1950fs
to contend with this frustrated chain of communication. The first was
the Commission Regionale d 1 Expansion Economique (CREE), which, in 1954,
began its initial inquiries into the realm of "economic geography."
This committee still exists; its current president is Michel
Phlipponneau. In its thirty-year history this organization has tackled
a variety of fascinating, and, some might say, unrealistic proposals.
Among these have been the support for a united European community,
funded by a single European currency. An early subcommittee, therefore,
had the heady title of Inspecteurs Generaux de 1'Administration en
mission Extraordinaire. By 1959, a series of land-use plans, only
34pertinent to Brittany, made CREE1s program more realistic.
On January 7, 1959 and on June 2, 1960, a Conscription d'Action 
Regionale (CAR) laid out specific land-use plans. The CAR was the first 
official attempt by Breton natives to determine to what use their land, 
cultivated or not, was subjected. One specific industry in the late 
1950's and early 1960's will serve to illustrate the specific tasks to 
which the regional economic committees were committed. From 1959 to 
1962, an overproduction of Breton artichokes glutted the market. This 
development caused prices to plummet, growers to suffer, and, subse­
quently, led producers to organize as a political constituency. Support 
came from a somewhat unexpected source: the intellectual elite of the
university set in Paris, who helped promote an artichoke boycott among
jq. / s
Michel Phlipponneau, Decentralisation et regionalisation: la
grande affair (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1981).
80
its like-minded, liberal, urban friends. The "artichoke affair" of the 
early 1960's was underway. In June of 1961 it came to a climax, when on
June 7 of that year 10,000 farmers gathered in the tiny town of Morlaix,
3 3Brittany. The organizers were mostly young farmers and factory
workers. They set afire surplus piles of artichokes and potatoes, cut
telephone wires, overturned vehicles and set up roadblocks. Their
arrest by the French government sparked even more street violence in
36the rural communities. The politics of radical economic protest 
had begun.
The French Poujade movement, named after Pierre Poujade, a right- 
wing tax protester from the small town of St. Cere, in the south of 
France, began in 1953. Though this party received no more proportional 
support in Brittany than it did in other rural regions of France, the 
Poujadistes issue of excessive government control and high taxation 
struck a responsive chord in Brittany. A growing cause celebre became 
the "little man," the factory worker or farmer who felt the new pros­
perity of the 1950's was passing him by.
In August, 1961, the Second Breton Plan was proposed. Again, the 
CREE was at the helm. It continued to present its plans for economic 
diversification and other, somewhat idealistic visions of an economic­
ally cooperative Europe. Meanwhile, splinter groups formed to deal with 
the more immediate economic crisis. The most active group in the 1960's 
was the youth of Brittany. Two organizations sprang up in 1961 to
^^Thoenig, "Local Government Institutions," 77. 
36ibid.
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address the growing concerns of young Breton farmers, the Centre 
National des Jeunes Agriculteurs ("National Center of Young Farmers") 
and the Jeunesse Agricole Chretienne ("Young Christian Farmers"). The 
parent organization, the Federation Nationale des Syndicats d 'Exploi- 
tants Agricoles, or "National Federation of Exploited Farmers," took a 
broader view on many farm-related issues of the so-called prosper­
ous 1960's.37
Concrete reforms began as early as March, 1964, through the
government-sponsored CAR. It created the post of regional prefect, to
coordinate the administrative tasks of the departmental prefects under
his jurisdiction, and to serve as a liaison between the region and the
State. Economic planning was the main thrust of the regional reform in
the mid-1960's though there was not always agreement on what form this
should take. It was, however, a unanimously held contention that local
decision making was far too dependent on the bureaucratic paper-
38shuffling in faraway Paris.
Much has been written on the French propensity to defer to author­
ity figures. Alain Peyrefitte, political analyst and cabinet member 
under President Giscard d'Estaing, first described the phenomenon as
a sickness in Le Mai fran^ais, which was translated into English as
39The Trouble With France. A nearly identical thesis is presented in
37Ibid., 78.
38ibid.
39Alain Peyrefitte, Le mal francais (Paris: Editions
Gallimard, 1979). *
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Michael Crozier's La Societee bloquee, or The Clogged Society. Both 
works address the ill-effects of overcentralization in French society.
In the hierarchical structure which governs the administrative pyramid, 
the smallest of regional concerns needs to be investigated, analyzed, 
and ratified by a Parisian authority. The resulting delay in response, 
often accompanied by a glaring misinterpretation of the problem at hand, 
has lead to extreme frustration on the part of the local citizenry.
Of course, post-war France was in need of a certain degree of
centralization. The rise to power of Charles De Gaulle resulted in a
great consolidation of political.authority. His discourse at Bayeux,
Normandy, in 1946 stressed the essential requirement of a centralization
41of power in order for France to survive. De Gaulle's return in 1958 
to establish the Fifth Republic was amidst circumstances which similarly 
called for a consolidation of power. A regime brought in to forestall a 
military coup is hardly likely to disperse authority.
A brief breakdown of what constitutes a Rightist from a Leftist 
stance in French politics is perhaps in order. Following the conven­
tional political presumptions, it would be expected that the Right would 
favor a restoration of power to the provinces. The implication would be 
that the localities would be freer of government control, unregulated in 
economic and social practices, and the powerful local elites could 
presumably pick up where they had left off under the Ancien Regime.
^Michael Crozier, La Societe bloquee (Paris: Editions
Gallimard, 1977),
41
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The Left, it would follow, would champion centralization. In true 
Jacobin spirit, leftists should associate regionalism with a reactionary 
return to the exploitation of the peasantry by a local elite. Ironic­
ally, however, the major push for decentralization in the last genera­
tion has come from the Left. There seemed to be an awakened conscious­
ness that "respect for the masses" also meant respecting
their differences.
* +
In 1961, Rene Plevon, still acting president of the CELIB wrote
42his L 1Avenir de la Bretagne. He postulated the need for Breton 
autonomy on a regional level, while, at the same time, there was a need
for vast consolidation on the communal level. Such needs as local
hospitalization and school districting were often undermined by the 
gargantuan amount of paper work required to propel a proposal from its 
place of origin to the decision-makers in Paris. Compounding the prob­
lem was the existence of 36,341 administrative units, whose proposals 
were treated as distinct and separate from one another. If a small 
community wanted to combine resources with a neighboring town to build
an area hospital, the proposal had to be considered as two separate 
43applications. The consolidation of funding and services often got 
lost in the bureaucratic shuffle, making such attempts at combined 
projects prove both frustrating and futile.
42 ' 'Rene Plevon, L 1Avenir de la Bretagne (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 
1961), 39.
43
Ibid., 51.
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Lawrence Wylie's A Village in the Vaucluse, though treating
another rural area of France, describes very clearly the problematic
44political dynamic that besets Brittany as well. A disdain for any­
thing that smacks of political maneuvering basically characterized the 
post-war French attitude. An individual's ability to "get around" 
administrative requirements and defy bureaucratic channels, sometimes 
even when such detours were blatantly illegal, was rarely looked at 
askance and often commended by the community as a whole. It is fondly 
referred to as the "systeme 'D'," defined as the laudable effort on 
the part of every red-blooded Frenchman to bypass the system. Though 
such noncompliance may have well served the individual, it often
presented an obstacle to community efforts, such as road improvement,
45school consolidation, and hospital extension services.
In many ways Brittany is much like the rest of France: complacent
until the crisis is at one's own front step. The United States had an 
expression to describe the shaky economic situation of the end of the 
Carter administration: "If your neighbor is out of work," so the
maxim stated, "the country is in a recession. If you are out of 
work, the country is in a depression, a deep one, and one that should 
have been prevented." The French also have this "Sauve Qui Peut," or 
"Everyone for Himself" outlook, except in the case of blatant regional
44Lawrence Wylie * A Village in the Vaucluse (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1974).
45Ibid., 208.
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discrimination, in which case the cultural homogeneity of Brittany has
46served as an asset to concerted group action.
Despite the cultural cohesiveness of the Breton people, Brittany
as a whole has not, by any means, acted in political unison. The
diverse interpretation voiced within the CELIB attests to the fact
that there were vast differences in understanding what constituted a
sound economic plan for Brittany. Rene Plevon, a technocrat and
graduate of the prestigious ENARC school of technology and finance,
championed the goal of economic modernization of Brittany. In his
CELIB-sponsored Second Breton Plan, he supported the recruiting of
new and varied industries to relocate in Brittany. Michel Phlipponneau,
the University of Rennes professor who was co-chair of the CELIB into
the mid-1960's, resigned his post in 1966 to protest what he considered
the committee's blind courtship of big industry. His scope was wider,
and perhaps unrealizable, encompassing a mutually supportive European
47economic community. Unlike the Common Market, the economic pulse of 
this community would not merely be protective of national interests, 
but be responsive to regional needs of aspirations within the respective 
member nations.
The economic planning of the CELIB championed the cause of 
increased industrialization in Brittany. By the mid-1960's Brittany 
did succeed in attracting a few very large national companies to open
46T, • j Ibid.
47Michel Phlipponneau, La Gauche et les Regions (Paris: Calmann-
Levy, 1967).
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branches in the province. The two largest were the Sud-Aviation plant
in Nantes, maker of the fuselage parts for the French and British
Concorde, and the Citroen factory in Rennes. Though both industries
brought immediate jobs and revenue to the area, the workforce was not
48completely enchanted by its treatment from Paris.
Pay scales were routinely scaled down to reflect the lower cost 
of living in the provinces. Yet wages were not the issue when the 
Sud-Aviation plant in Nantes was shut down by a workers' walk-out in 
the spring of 1968. The issue was not even workers' benefits, nor the 
much publicized, heated debates over lowering or raising the retire­
ment age.
All French workers receive five weeks paid vacation. Factories 
literally close down for the month of August, making it possible for 
workers to vacation with their families, to visit their parents, or 
perhaps even rent a small villa on the coast. The August break also 
explains the clogged highways and overbooked resorts. Though the 
factory shutdowns in summer cause a substantial drop in national 
industrial output, and cause congestion and inconvenience in the 
countryside, France is a country steeped in tradition, and has consis­
tently rejected government proposals to stagger vacation times through­
out the year. Workers receive free health care, and women workers are 
granted extensive maternal leave. The retirement issue mentioned above 
was never a workers' issue per se, but something the workers argued 
among themselves, while sipping pastis at a local cafe. Some workers
48Ibid., 22.
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supported the lowering of the retirement age from age sixty-five to age 
sixty. The French government supported this stance, since the earlier 
departing retirees would open up the job market for the swelling ranks 
of unemployed French youth. Others championed the right-to-work issue
for senior citizens. In either case, the retirement issue was not the
<  >■ 49
cause celebre of worker revolts in France in the 1960's.
The chief complaint at the Sud-Aviation plant in Nantes was 
management/labor relations. Workers, and perhaps Breton workers more 
than French workers in general, have little patience for Parisian pomp 
and incompetence. An incident at the plant in 1966, as told by a worker 
to a journalist then covering the May of 1968 protest, may best exem­
plify this point. Given an exclusive tour of the fuselage factory,
where Breton workers were making intricate parts for the Caravalle jet 
of the Super Sonic Transport, the Parisian supervisor amiably asked 
where the propeller on a jet was found.
The term autogestion has come to describe the type of collegial 
labor/management rapport that was desired by the workers at the Nantes 
plant. Though "collegial" would not accurately describe the relation­
ship in terms of wages or social class, it was hoped that workers and 
management could both serve in a decision-making capacity regarding 
factory improvements and concerns. Even the labor unions were to be 
bypassed in this effort toward self-determination and membership
Today's union demands have changed very little: a retire­
ment age of sixty and six weeks (as opposed to the present five) of 
paid vacation.
~^New York Times, 12 May 1968, 13.
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consensus. Needless to say, the French unions scrambled to try to
strengthen their ranks by championing this latest expression of
worker discontent. ^
A lack of rapport between union leaders and labor had long been
felt among the blue collar workers of France. There are three main
political bodies representing labor: the Communist-led Confederation
* *
Generale de Travail (CGT) or the General Confederation of Labor; the
/ /
Catholic oriented Confederation Francaise des Travailleurs Chretiens
------------------- 5-------------------:-------------
(CFTC), or the French Confederation of Christian Workers; and the 
Socialist Force Ouvriere (FO), or Workers Force. Union dues were 
collected clandestinely for the most part in French factories. Union 
posters and announcements were subject to management censorship and 
union meetings had to be held outside the plant, and outside of 
workers' hours.
French unions have had a history of public and ineffective action
against management. A standard ploy of French management which was
resented by Breton workers was management's use of "the bonus."
Productivity bonuses, efficiency bonuses, and holiday bonuses were
53given out or held back at the whim of the management. Strikers wanted 
these arbitrary and manipulative grants of "prize money" incorporated 
back into their wages as money earned, not awarded at the management's
51ibid.
52Ibid.
53Edward Shorter and Carles Tilly, Strikes in France, 1830-1968 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 342.
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discretion. This particular grievance is significant because it mani­
fests the arrogant paternalism which so inhibited and frustrated the
workers. Such a feeling of frustration over administrative obstacles
54brought worker agitation to a head.
Worker dissent in france has not only had a repressive history, 
but a violent one. In 1908 municipal police opened fire on strikers 
in a Paris suburb, killing three.^ Under the Fourth Republic, the 
Minister of the Interior brought out the French army, complete with 
tanks, to end a miners' strike in 1948. Political divisions entered 
as a consideration in the Fifth Republic, although there had been a 
three-way split in the labor movement since World War I. This lack of 
solidarity would later work against the workers, as union leaders 
proved ineffective at the negotiating table.
As the prosperity of the early 1960's began to falter, the popu­
larity of the Gaullist regime was shaken. A foundry in Morbihan closed 
in 1967, causing the loss of 1,500 jobs."^ Iron workers in Finistere, 
longshoremen in Brest and Quiberon, and factory workers in Nantes, 
Rennes, and Saint-Brieuc were all beginning to voice discontent over 
lack of management response to their grievances. And the Breton con­
stituency with the longest history of government resistance, the
54Ibid., 343.
~^New York Times, 16 June, 1968, 62.
56Ibid.
^^Phlipponneau, La Gauche et les regions (Paris: Calmann-Levy,
1967), ii
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farmer, was increasingly dissatisfied with the ill-effects of econo­
mic modernization.
De Gaulle's grandiose scheme concerning France's role in the 
Common Market is illustrative of the regime's preoccupation with 
France's foreign economic posturing, rather than her own economic ills. 
Price control was a major grievance in regard to Common Market trade 
policies. Low prices on both beef and dairy products were made obliga­
tory in order for French farmers to effectively compete against other 
Common Market countries. Such price regulation adversely affected the 
small landholders who could not afford to lower prices to government- 
appointed levels. Twenty-five percent of Breton farmers owned less than
thirteen acres of land. Nearly 50 percent owned less than fifty 
58acres. Very few of these family-owned operations owned the modern
equipment necessary to meet the government's projected agricultural
scheme. To remedy this situation, the De Gaulle regime increasingly
advocated the merger of small landholdings into more sizable, more
59profit-making centers of production.
This consolidation provoked deep and widespread resentment in 
Brittany. Paris's efforts to direct local development met with hostile 
response from Breton farmers who historically have clung tenaciously 
to their small plots of land. Government supervision of local develop­
ment, with its manipulative mapping and allocation of funds led an
Ibid. , v n .
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American journalist to declare that "the technocrats seem ready to 
sacrifice a whole region in the name of their conception of 
modern France.
Politically, the volatile mood of the 1960's was being felt in
Brittany. The youthful president of the Young Farmers' Organization
professed the revolutionary fervor of the times when he charged: "We
are the serfs, the slaves of the modern e r a ! A  splinter group from
the Mouvement pour 1'Organization de la Bretagne formed and called
itself the Union Democratique Bretonne (UDB). The UDB, with socialist
leanings, is the only one of the diverse autonomist organizations which
62still exists today.
In the two and a half decades of Breton history treated in this 
chapter, Breton autonomist movements from both extremes of the political 
spectrum appeared. From the few but fervent Nazi collaborators during 
World War II, to the complacency of the 1950's, to the growing number 
of splinter political groups formed in the early 1960's, the history of 
recent Breton autonomy efforts presents a very distinct picture of a 
movement which had been championed by the Right and Left alike. By the 
mid-1960's, organized labor attempted to capitalize on Breton worker 
discontent, hoping to successfully champion the role of autogestion, or 
worker participation in the running of the factories. In many ways, 
autogestion provides an apt parallel to the Breton autonomist movement.
^U.S. News and World Report, 27 May, 1968, 42.
*^New York Times, 25 May, 1968, 14.
62Personal observation in Vannes, Brittany, May, 1985.
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Both movements championed the right to an increased level of self- 
determination— be it economic, political, or cultural.
Breton autonomy took on some of its most radical tenor on the
eve of World War II. Its most colorful leaders, Olivier Mordrel,
/
Francez Debauvier, and Nazi sympathizer Celestin Laine, led Breton 
activism down a bold and treacherous path in the 1930's and 1940's.
The unfortunate affiliation of a small but highly visible group of 
Breton activists with Nazi Germany left Brittany the awkward legacy 
of collaboration with the enemy during World War II. Though this 
assessment is highly inaccurate when applied to the majority of 
Breton regionalists, the indictment of the top autonomist leaders of 
the post World War I generation served to stifle, to a large extent, 
regional extremism in the following decade.
The 1950's saw a concerted effort to procure government sanction 
for regional reform. The CELIB, a think-tank of prominent Breton 
professionals who served as liaisons with the government, sought to 
assess the economic needs of the region and to propose solutions to 
stave off potential economic disaster in Brittany.
In 1967 President De Gaulle delivered his most positive speech 
concerning regional reform efforts. He delivered this address in the 
small town of Bayeux, the same town in Normandy where he had 
delivered his call to centralization twenty years earlier. The theme 
this time was far more compatible to the idea of granting increased 
measures of regional autonomy. It is particularly ironic that, at 
what turned out to have been the eleventh hour for the De Gaulle 
regime, this moment of constructive dialogue between a powerful
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French president and the struggling provinces was to be thwarted by
63the "angry days of May."
The "angry days of May" roughly date from an initial incident 
at the Sorbonne of the 11th of May, 1968, through the workers' strikes 
and general student protests, until De Gaulle's plebiscite in June.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Activism Rekindled: Breton Activism from
May, 1968 to The Present
The 1960?s were turbulent years on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Student unrest rocked the cities of western Europe, while protests on 
the campuses of Berkeley, Columbia, and, later, Madison were making 
headlines in the United States. Though there is a temptation to fuse 
the countless expressions of campus unrest into one universal expression 
of dissatisfaction, the reality is that the issues in Europe were quite 
different from the anti-Vietnam War protests in the United States. To 
be sure, there were varying degrees of anti-Establishment dissension 
within the United States, yet, for many, the key impetus of American 
student unrest on a large scale can be traced to the U.S. involvement 
in Vietnam. Social issues, such as civil rights for blacks, poverty, 
and educational reform, certainly account for a large part of the early 
movement, and such concerns were the thrust of the Berkeley "free 
speech" movement which emerged in 1964.^
For further information on the United States situation, see 
Godfrey Hodgson, America In Our Time: From World War II to Nixon—
What Happened and Why (New York: Vintage Books, 1976); and Allen J.
Matusow, The Unravelling of America: A History of Liberalism in the
1960s (New York: Harper and Row, 1984).
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Similarly, Europe in the 1960's was experiencing social unrest 
that was both philosophical and practical in nature. While university 
students championed the overthrow of bourgeois society, blue-collar 
workers simply wanted a larger share of the capitalist pie. Amidst 
these divergent impulses was a renewed sense of activism concerning 
regional autonomy. Brittany experienced the turmoil of the 1960's on 
all the above levels: student unrest, worker discontent, and a resur­
gence of regional activism. It might be wise at first, however, to 
examine the 1960's in France, as manifested by the 1968 uprising known 
as "the angry days of May."
The spark of the May uprising can be traced directly back to an 
industrial, working class suburb of Paris called Nanterre. On April 4, 
one thousand students converged on the administration of the four-year- 
old university to protest a variety of school policies. Student acti­
vity in 1968 was anything but a novelty. Uprisings and demonstrations 
had been a common event in France's turbulent history since World
War II. And since that time, the student population had tripled 
2
in size.
At the University of Nanterre, a two-hour student symposium was 
held in a faculty lecture hall on April 12, denouncing everything from 
the pedantic nature of a French education, to a sweeping political 
condemnation of what the students termed to be a "stifling bourgeois 
culture." The protest then defined its stance more broadly. The
^U.S. News and World Report, 27 May, 1968, 42.
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attack was soon launched as a defiance to the whole of established
institutions, with the "facade of the university system" as 
3
the target.
Undeniably, the student leaders had the wage-earning proletariat 
in mind when they spoke of their intentions toward a social revolution. 
Their self-appointed role in the struggle against imperialistic, capi­
talistic exploitation clearly rang of the Marxian rhetoric. Yet the 
initial impetus for student protest concerned issues limited to univer­
sity life. Thomas Molnar, in a National Review article traced the 
student transition from academic, local grievants to a political 
status of revolutionary spokesmen:
Before the students may become useful to the 
Revolution, they must apparently be made to 
rebel against something relevant to their 
academic life. Once mobilized for a secondary 
cause, students can be expected to support the 
radical minority in taking over/
Political splintering characterized the French student uprisings. 
They were evidenced in numerous divergent forms at Nanterre. Factions 
of Trotskyists, Maoists, and Anarchists aired their respective ideolo­
gies and programs of action, but the French Communist Party was not 
among them. It, like other more conventional parties, dismissed the 
demonstrators as young trouble-makers.^
3
Theodore Zeldin, Conflicts in French Society (London: George
Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1970), 11.
4
Thomas Molnar, "D-Day at Brooklyn College," National Review, 97, 
30 January, 1968, 87.
^Le Monde, 20 May, 1968, 2.
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The student activity which is most cited as the germ which set
the revolt on its irrevocable course was a student agitation movement
which took place on March 11, about a month earlier than the headline-
making demonstration at Nanterre in April. The "movement of March,"
as it was later cited, was regarded by its participants as the beginning
of French student activism. It brought to the forefront a revolutionary
£
folk hero named Daniel Cohn-Bendit.
Cohn-Bendit, a native of Berlin, was described in newspaper 
accounts of the day as "a chubby, cherubic young man," an "engaging 
freckle-faced nihilist," and, most commonly, as "Danny the Red," both 
for his shade of hair, as well as his misidentification by the press 
as a card-carrying Communist.^ As will be seen, the Communist Party 
only belatedly claimed responsibility for the worker-student activism 
of the Spring of 1968. Initial public sympathy came to the student 
cause as a result of the continued mistreatment of the protesters by 
overzealous police.^
When nearly 30,000 students were bludgeoned unmercifully by 
approximately 20,000 "hard-bitten, specially trained riot policemen
9
brought in from the provinces" most observers sided with the students.
In scenes reminiscent of the 1848 Commune, with barricades erected on
Cohn-Bendit is featured in La revolte etudiante: Les animateurs
parlent, Herve Bourges, ed. (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1968).
^New York Times, 13 May, 1968, 6.
^Le Monde, 25 May, 1968, 1.
9
Newsweek, 27 May, 1968, 44.
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century-old cobblestone streets, the students gained support from many 
sectors of the population. Numerous times, grandmotherly women were 
observed dropping flower pots from sixth-story windows onto the helmeted 
heads of riot policemen. Housewives and shopkeepers also provided 
buckets of water with which to douse needy students who were stricken 
with tear-gas.
At a Sorbonne emergency aid center, riot police clubbed the
doctors, nurses, and patients in the hallways and classrooms.^ Banging
their clubs in unison as they advanced, the police corps provoked even
further the anger of the residents by randomly gassing sidewalk cafes
along the route. It was these spectacles of Government misconduct, not
the students' political ideologies, which secured public support for
12"the bloodied student veterans of the Latin Quarter."
On May 12, French labor moved to support the students by calling 
a twenty-four hour nationwide strike to protest the brutal police 
tactics. France's three largest labor federations: the Socialist-led
Workers' Force, the Catholic-oriented French Confederation of Labor, 
and the Communist-led General Confederation of Labor officially joined 
with the Teachers of the Federation of National Education and the count­
less ad hoc student associations in a massive anti-Government rally.
The French Government had made last minute attempts at negotiation in 
order to appease the broad wave of sympathy which the students had
^ New York Times, 25 May, 1968, 4. 
*^Newsweek, 27 May, 1968, 45.
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evoked. Premier Georges Pompidou in a radio announcement suggested that
charges against the arrested students might not be pressed. But this
gesture was too little too late. What had begun as a minor revolt at
Nanterre had flared into a major political controversy, unleashing
13sentiments of broad dissatisfaction with the Gaullist regime.
De Gaulle's casual response to the May uprising, whose participants
on occasion numbered 500,000 marching forty abreast down the avenues of
Paris, was that its participants were "students who cannot keep up with 
14their classes." He confidently continued his tour of Eastern Europe, 
leaving Premier Pompidou to man the battle stations. The protest now 
had spread well beyond the Latin Quarter.
Orly airport shut down on May 18 because of a 48-hour walk-out by 
ground technicians. Later that same evening labor unions announced that 
the strike had spread to the national railroads. International trains 
stopped whenever the strike order reached them, often in small towns, 
depositing hundreds of puzzled foreign passengers throughout the 
countryside. Barge traffic on all major rivers also came to a halt.
A thousand barge and tugboat crewmen struck on May 19, completing the 
paralysis of Marseilles harbor, France's largest port and her gateway 
to Africa and the Far East. At the northwestern port of Le Havre, all 
vessels were moored to their dock; many of the masts featured red flags.
13Anne C. Loring, "What Happened in France During 'the Angry Days 
of May,' 1968?" (Senior Thesis in History, William Woods College,
March 30, 1976), 33.
14Life, 31 May, 1968, 6.
Ibid.
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Customs officials joined the striking dockers at most ports the 
following day."^
Vineyard owners and truck gardeners barricaded the highways in 
southern France, and farmers on tractors clattered through towns in 
Brittany and Provence. Workers in the steel mills in Lorraine received 
orders from their union to strike on May 22. Coal mines in Alsace shut 
down shortly thereafter. In Paris the farmers’ open market of Les 
Hailes in the heart of the city joined the strike, leaving mounds of 
abandoned fruits and vegetables. City subways had ground themselves 
to a steady halt on May 19. Parisian cab drivers, all fifteen hundred 
of them, struck on May 23.^
Though the May crisis is often described as a Parisian phenomenon, 
earlier signs of popular dissent were more visible in provincial France. 
Here, the grievances were not limited to the highly educated jargon of 
campus revolutionaries. A long-standing sentiment of dissatisfaction 
and alienation from government found expression in rural France long 
before the students went into action.
Anti-government sentiment in Brittany in the Spring of 1968 took 
on the violent nature that had formerly characterized the Breiz Atao 
activities in the 1930’s. Not since that decade had a series of violent 
incidents, championed by various groups of Breton nationalists, brought 
such widespread attention to the Breton cause. In early Spring a
^Jean Bothorel, La Bretagne Contre Paris (Paris: Editions de
la Table Ronde, 1969), ~£T.
^New York Times, 25 May, 1968, 15.
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government tax office was bombed in Lorient, Brittany. Seven days later
a police garage was demolished in the small nearby village of 
18Bannalec. Though protests of this nature would continue in Brittany
long after the "angry days of May," the renewed activism of the early
1970's traces its impetus to May of 1968.
The difficulty in analyzing the political implications of May of
'68 for Brittany is that the atmosphere was extremely heady and the
issues so diverse. Breton nationalist songs were given air-time for
19the first time ever on the state-controlled radio stations. The Place
Royale section of the city of Nantes hoisted Breton flags, and was
20renamed, again, briefly, la Place de la Liberation. But the bold days 
of May probably served to undermine what would have been landmark legis­
lation for regional autonomy. In June, De Gaulle responded to the May 
agitation with a sweeping proposal which included a number of conces­
sions toward regional reform. This measure, however, rested on
21De Gaulle's sponsorship and continued popularity. The latter did not 
survive May of 1968.
Though Paris can legitimately claim to be the birthplace of the 
student unrest, Nantes, Brittany, must be credited as the birthplace of 
the massive labor unrest during the May crisis. On May 11, the
18Yannick Guin, Histoire de la Bretagne (Paris: Librairie
Francois Maspero, 1977), 295.
~^ New York Times, 21 May, 1968, 17.
20Personal interview with former student, March, 1977,
Nantes, Brittany.
21
Loring, "What Happened In France," 39.
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Sud-Aviation plant, maker of parts for the French/British Concorde SST, 
was struck. Then, on May 13, the company president was locked into his 
office by the workers. Workers had taken over the plant at 9:30 a.m., 
and had imprisoned twenty other management personnel in their offices. 
When a reporter asked of the plant manager’s comfort under such condi­
tions a worker responded: "He has a suite of four offices, which is a
22lot bigger than my apartment. He's doing fine."
The workers were in a somewhat festive mood after a few days of 
worker-occupation. They had welded the factory gates closed to out­
siders. Workers’ wives (though many of the striking workers were women) 
shuttled in and out with bread and wine, and they kept the management 
amply supplied with both as well. The strike involved 2,000 of the
2,800 workers. Those who did not join in the occupation found their
23front doors painted yellow when they returned home.
According to the workers, the spirit of protest had been brewing
for months in Nantes. This is important to note, since the newspaper
coverage of the May crisis, almost without exception, cites the students
as the real instigators. For example, one newspaper claimed that "in
exuberant imitation of the student movement, the workers of France today 
24voiced protest." Such statements are both misleading and inaccurate. 
Once, in the midst of the crisis, a reporter visited the Nantes plant 
to speculate on the chronology of student-worker protest. One worker
^ New York Times, 21 May, 1968, 17.
23Ibid.
24Ibid., 18.
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responded to the newsman’s suggestion that the students ’’showed the
way,” retorting:
Sure, we know what they did. But we had been 
struggling for a month already. We don’t need them.
We’ve been fighting management for years, so we 
don’t like to hear them lecture us about r e v o l u t i o n . 25
By May 13, when both student and worker activist groups flooded 
the streets of most major French cities, the French Government was 
alerted that a potentially very powerful partnership was underway. The 
workers garnered the muscle of the movement when the three largest labor 
unions consolidated in support of the student protest in Paris. It was 
the workers’ decision to back the more vocal, more explosive student 
movement which gave substance and endurance to the uprising.
By May 22 the workers’ movement carried such momentum and force 
that it had effectively paralyzed almost all private industry in a 
general strike involving seven million workers. That a seemingly local­
ized protest of 2,000 could mushroom to involve half a nation’s labor 
force in a three week span was an extraordinary development. The extent 
of the protest, however, came as a complete surprise to the workers at 
Nantes: "All that we wanted were a few economic demands,” recalled
M. Vincent, a Sud-Aviation employee. "But now, everything has changed.
The country is in a revolutionary situation. Perhaps we can get a
26change in government too.”
25Ibid., 9.
26New York Times, 21 May, 1968, 16.
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Still, it is an oversimplification to suggest that the Breton
farmer or blue-collar worker had much in common with the vanguard of
university protesters. At the beginning of the labor strike, a grizzled
old worker, deploring the violence in the Latin Quarter, had said of the
27students: "Why, they're even burning cars! It's madness!" A car
was what he wanted most, a long-awaited purchase he was planning for 
his two sons. Meanwhile, inside the lecture halls of the Sorbonne 
student orators held marathon all-night rallies on "the anasthesia of
affluence," or on the condemnation of "bourgeois spectacles," and on
2 8"How to Share the Revolution with the Mass of French Workers."
By contrast, the issues in the French labor strike were essen­
tially economic. Workers requested an increase in the hourly wage from 
the equivalent of forty-five to sixty cents and a general wage increase 
in private industry of ten percent. Labor spokesmen demanded a reduc­
tion of the standard work week from forty-five to forty hours, and for 
earlier retirement eligibility. These basic bread-and-butter demands
hardly seem compatible with the flamboyant political rhetoric of the
29student revolutionaries.
An illustrative student-worker conversation reported in the New 
York Times Magazine cites a student activist as he lectured a striking 
worker: "You've got to think beyond a ten percent wage increase," said
the student. "What good would it do you if we're still being exploited
^ New York Times, 30 May, 1968, 30.
T O
Time Magazine, 24 May, 1968, 34.
29New York Times, 30 May, 1968, 30.
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by the capitalist system?" "First," responded the worker, "I'd like to
30see that wage increase. I've got three kids."
For Brittany, the ironies of May, 1968, are numerous and profound.
Though the general headiness of the day seemed invigorating, and may
have compelled more than a few youthful Bretons to take on the mantle
of "regionalist rights," or at least carry a placard to that effect in
order to join in the spirit of the streets, the spirited protests did
little to promote an understanding of regionalist issues. The re-formed
Comite d 'Etude et de Liaison des Interets de la Bretagne (CELIB), nearly
succumbed to the cynical decisions that often malign French government-
sponsored committees. Luckily, it received a stay of execution, and
continues to be one of the most effective liaison organizations, often
serving as a model for other regions of western Europe which are seeking
to work within the framework of their own governments to achieve a
31higher degree of autonomy.
The denouement of the May crisis was both anti-climactic and 
ironic. The French Government began coming to terms with the crisis on 
May 22. A motion of censure was filed the day before by Opposition 
leaders in the National Assembly. Key Socialist figures, including 
Francois Mitterrand, then a Deputy, Gaston Deferre, and former Premier 
Pierre Mendes-France, led the non-Communist appeal for a Popular Front 
to oppose the Gaullist regime. The motion of censure was directed
~^New York Times, 26 May, 1968, 3.
31Zeldin, Conflicts in French Society, 33.
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against the French Parliament. De Gaulle had left for a state
visit to Rumania as a diplomatic gesture toward Eastern Europe on 
32
May 11.
The initial anti-Government action was diverted, through a consti­
tutional provision, against the Government of Premier Georges Pompidou, 
in whose charge the government was delegated through De Gaulle’s some­
what reckless absence. The Ministry of Education, as well as the 
Ministry of the Interior, under whose jurisdiction the Paris police 
force ruthlessly and later resentfully, followed government orders to
disperse student gatherings at the Sorbonne, were charged with "gross
33mishandling" of the May student uprising. Workers were without any
indication of a forthcoming wage and benefit increase at that date
(May 22), so their growing agitation was exerting pressure upon the
34voting members of the National Assembly as well.
The motion of censure required an absolute majority of the four 
hundred Deputies. An opposition showing of that extent necessitated 
all the Centrist votes, and most of the unaffiliated votes to join with 
the Left. The Left also expected a number of Gaullists to defect to 
the Opposition. Defections among the Gaullist Right, however, failed 
to materialize. The future Gaullist president, Valery Giscard 
d ’Estaing, counseled his party against further disrupting an already
32Sacke de Gramant, "The French Workers Want to Join the 
Affluent Society, Not to Wreck It," New York Times Magazine, 16 June, 
1968, 8.
33J Ibid.
34Ibid., 9.
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volatile political situation by dissolving the Pompidou Government.
The vote of censure against the Government failed by eleven votes.
This narrow victory for the Gaullist incumbents was hardly reflec­
tive of popular confidence in the Gaullist regime. A major part of the 
frustration which continued into June was due to the seeming invinci­
bility of De Gaulle himself. Only in the event of death or incapacita­
tion could De Gaulle’s seven year term be disrupted. In De Gaulle’s 
self-tailored Constitution of 1958, the chronically volatile French 
Government was given a new stability through the Gaullist intention of 
making the President powerful and the Parliament weak. The President, 
once elected, stands immune from parliamentary removal. De Gaulle even 
had the authority to reappoint Pompidou as Premier in the event the vote 
of censure against him succeeded.^
This defiant course of action proved to be unnecessary. On May 25, 
De Gaulle himself, in a seven minute television address announced his 
intention of setting a referendum before the people in the form of a new 
general election. De Gaulle consented to the public demand for "greater
participation by everyone in the conduct and results of the activity in
37which he is directly concerned.”
The ultimate irony for Brittany is most clearly seen in the spirit 
of this last statement of De Gaulle. Rocked by the tumult and plunging 
in popularity, De Gaulle continued, nonetheless, to translate into
35.,.,Ibid.
36Zeldin, Conflicts in French Society, 122.
37
Gramant, "The French Workers," 9.
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concrete legislative proposals his promise to promote "greater partici­
pation" by the people in the areas of life which most affect them. 
Crystallized into three vivid areas as a result of the May uprising, 
these were education, the workplace, and local government. A new word 
was even coined, something the French are loathe to do, to describe this
new deliberate attempt at increased popular participation in the
, . . 38decision-making process: autogestion.
The term most accurately applies to increased employee participa­
tion in the running of the workplace, and it can be said that of the 
three facets of life cited, employee-employer relations improved most 
dramatically after May, 1968. The bungling, patronizing relationship 
between management and employee, between union leader and union member—  
indeed, the harsh hierarchical character of the workplace in general—  
probably has softened somewhat, lending a far more amicable atmosphere 
than ever before. Such a climate in the workplace, conducive to a 
collegial exchange of ideas, is dramatically different from the tradi­
tional stratified class system which continues to characterize much of 
French society. It can be argued, however, that it was not so much 
political activism which improved the workers' lot, but a bolstered
economy, which most probably arrived on its cyclical cue, oblivious to
39the angry demands of May.
38
Autogestion literally refers to self-direction within
the workplace. 
39
Loring, "What Happened in France," 45.
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The students at the University of Rennes, Brittany, did not fare
nearly as well in accomplishing the tasks of their ambitious agenda.
John S. Ambler, an American political scientist, wrote an article
commemorating the uprising entitled "The Politics of University Reform:
40Ten Years After May." He rightly points out that the influence of 
the May student riots was decidedly exaggerated in terms of tangible 
achievements. Far from being the vanguard of a new society, the only 
immediate gain for the students was the privilege, in state universi­
ties, of addressing their professors by the familiar "tu" rather than
41the formal "vous" in class. Even this achievement was short-lived, 
perhaps somewhat akin to the "encounter sesions" which were at one time 
popular on U.S. campuses. Both practices have given way to a more 
formal approach to schooling on both continents.
Despite much publicized anti-American sentiment in France in the 
1970's, student political activism has moderated. Environmental issues 
and anti-nuclear protests, especially those of the Greenpeace movement, 
have seemingly replaced campus-centered political activism. The only 
further evidence of "student activism" in recent years was the 1982 
popular protest against President Mitterrand's proposal to deny 
government funding to the nation's parochial schools. The measure was 
overwhelmingly defeated. The most recent student protest of any 
magnitude was held in 1981 when a group of medical students marched
40John S. Ambler, "The Politics of University Reform: Ten Years
After May," Contemporary French Civilization, 33 (June, 1974), 21.
41Conversation with students at the Sorbonne, Paris, June, 1976.
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on the Champs Elysees to protest the dearth of well-paying jobs which
awaited them upon graduation.4^
Yannick Guin, the Breton historian whose 1977 Histoire de la
Bretagne has been amply cited in this treatment, entitles his assess-
43ment of the late 1960's as the "era of contradictions." He describes 
the unlikely coalition which evolved (and which persisted, so he claims, 
ten years later), between urban and rural activists, between blue collar 
workers and the sons and daughters of the privileged classes. Punctu­
ated with statistics tracing the demographic and economic make-up of 
Breton activists of the late 1960's and early 1970's, Guin asserts that 
the distinction between urban and rural, educated and blue-collar, had
dissipated in favor of a renewed sense of solidarity against socio-
44economic injustice. He cites the student participation in the "milk
wars" of 1971 and 1972, in which university students, many from Paris,
joined dairy farmers from Brittany and Normandy to protest the price
supports which the governments of Common Market countries used to an
45unfair advantage over small French farm operations.
Such expressions of resistance provoked animated response on the 
part of government officials. The protests were brutally squelched by 
the French government, and many of the more vocal leaders were arrested
42Le Monde, 20 May, 1968, 2.
43Yannick Guin, Histoire de la Bretagne (Paris: Librairie
Francois Maspero, 1977), 295-316.
44Ibid., 295-96.
45Ibid., 296.
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and sentenced to unreasonably harsh prison terms. The fickle price
fluctuations of everything from turnips to tuna kept the Breton farm
47community politically active long after the May crisis. In the mid- 
1970*s, the economic concerns of Breton fishermen, to cite one example, 
aligned them with the environmentalist movement, then in its early
stages in Europe, after a series of oil spills devastated the lobster
48and mussel harvest off the Breton coast. In the cause of environ­
mental integrity, as in other continued expressions of cultural sover­
eignty, the province of Brittany has more consistently manifested the 
spirit of May of '68 than any other region of France.
Though never passed, a specific piece of legislation, proposed by 
a weakened De Gaulle administration, was alluded to earlier and is 
worthy of mention. At times, in the history of a particular movement, 
the laws not passed are more significant than those that are. Such is 
the case with the referendum of April 27, 1969. Regional reform was the 
first item proposed. Voters were asked to vote yes or no to the notion 
of a redistribution of state-regional authority. The referendum was so 
vague as to be interpreted as both meaningless and, to some, menacing. 
The rightist weekly L ’Aurore, normally supportive of De Gaulle, reacted: 
"To ask a nation like ours, an adult nation, to vote yes or no— and we
x
don’t know exactly on what— is a fine underdeveloped form of democracy.
46Ibid., 298.
47Ibid., 300-303.
48Ibid., 305.
49New York Times, 25 May, 1968, 1.
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In addition, De Gaulle submitted his own, highly controversial 
reform which called for the abolition of the French Senate. If this 
second reform was to have served the interests of the first, most 
critics do not see how. In any case, all hopes for the passage of the 
relatively moderate proposals for regional reform were dashed by the 
unlikelihood that the local notables would approve of the abolition of 
the Senate.^ Finally, De Gaulle put his own political future on the 
line by challenging the French public to pass the referendum or he would 
exit from the political stage. Therefore, does one read the resounding 
defeat of the 1969 referendum as anti-regionalist, or anti-Senate 
reform, or anti-De Gaulle?
In 1972 a watered-down regional reform bill, the Loi Frey, was 
passed. Although decentralists had hoped for directly elected regional 
assemblies, the downgrading of the prefect, and more funding of specific 
regional governments, the Loi Frey provides for indirectly elected 
regional assemblies, limited funding, and a vague weakening of the line 
of power from Paris. The chief governmental executive of the region was 
still the prefect. Critics charge that the Loi Frey has actually served 
simply to streamline administrative control of the provinces
c n * 51from Paris.
Though the early 1970’s were disappointing for Brittany in terms 
of regional reform legislation, the period was one of the most active
~^Guin, Histoire de la Bretagne, 307.
~^Peter A. Gourevitch, Paris and the Provinces (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), 89.
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in terms of cultural revival. The economic and legislative failures of 
the period were followed by a resurgence of Breton activism. After the 
Milk Wars of 1972, a coalition of the more radical element.s of the 
growing Breton nationalist movement formed what could be called a 
"French populist support group.11 Their meetings attracted many frus­
trated farmers, who carried on the legacy of the milk protest by adapt-
52ing the slogan: "Our milk, our fight!" They were joined by striking
workers from the Joint manufacturing plant in the town of Lorient,
which was shut down by a walk-out in 1971 over the issue of absentee
53management, and the factory's policy of not hiring union members.
In the Spring of 1972, the prefecture in the town of Saint-Brieuc
was bombed, as was the sub-prefecture in Dinan. The customs office at
Saint Malo also was damaged by a bomb blast. Claiming responsibility
was a highly clandestine student-militant farmer organization called the
Front de la Liberation de la Bretagne (FLB). On June 22 the home of a
lawyer who had helped to foreclose on a small farm in Fougere was
vandalized. The offenders were teenage members of the FLB. Testifying
at the trial on behalf of the young offenders were Joseph Martray and
Michele Phlipponneau, both prominent citizens who had served as liaison
spokesmen between the regionalists and the French government. When the
youths were acquitted, Breton flags were hoisted in commemoration above
54Notre Dame in Paris by fellow activists.
52Guin, Histoire de la Bretagne, 309.
5L,.,Ibid.
54Ibid., 310-11.
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Continued unrest in the Spring of 1973 was manifested by a bizarre 
strike against a candy factory, and lead to a further consolidation of 
unlikely constituents. Sister Madeleine (in France family names of nuns 
are not normally used), a young nun, was working in the candy factory of 
Guemene-Penfao, in a tiny village in the department of Finistere.^^
She found the conditions for the workers, mostly adolescent daughters 
of farmers and fishermen, to be so deplorable that she organized a small 
protest. Union activists from other towns helped to champion her cause, 
to the consternation of many of the local families, including those of 
some of the workers, who desperately needed the small income their 
daughters earned. The objections of the residents were soothed, however, 
by the involvement of the Emgleo Belein Breizh, the rural Catholic 
organization which had served as a vehicle for preserving Breton 
culture, language, and tradition since the 1940’s. The strike was 
successful, conditions improved, and a new coalition proved viable: 
farmers, workers, and the Breton Catholic Church.
The missing element, the intellectual elite, was not dormant.
Though the CELIB, the think-tank organization sponsored by the French 
government to oversee Breton concerns, had severely suffered in reputa­
tion and effectiveness as a result of the May crisis, a new generation 
of Breton activists had emerged. For this younger elite, May of '68 
erupted during their impressionable youth. Happy to follow in step
55Ibid., 314.
“^ Jean Markale, Histoire secrete de la Bretagne (Paris: Editions
Albin Michel, 1977), 239.
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under the leadership of the "veterans of May," the pre-'68 Mouvement 
pour 1'Organisation de la Bretagne (MOB) and the Parti Nationalist 
Breton (PNB), did not adapt quickly enough to this new youthful radical­
ism, and consequently did not survive. The Union Democratique Bretonne 
(UDB), on the other hand, professed its goals in language more in 
keeping wi'th the times: anti-imperialism, non-alignment, pro-
Third World.^
Without a doubt, the most politically active of Breton organiza­
tions of the early 1970's, and perhaps the organization which felt 
itself to be the true descendant of the '68 vision, was the FLB. In its 
most active period, 1973 to 1978, the FLB was under the direction of
Yann Goulet, a Breton nationalist then living outside of Dublin,
5 8Ireland, in the small town of Bray. Extreme caution was taken in
revealing his identity, or that of other FLB members, since farmers,
workers, and local priests had all been under surveillance and, in some
59cases, imprisonment, during the previous few years.
The FLB incorporated a wide smattering of interest groups, includ­
ing elderly activists from the Breton nationalist movement of the 1930's, 
until a highly radical departure within the group led to the formation 
of the Armee de Liberation de la Bretagne (ALB).^  This group caused
"^Bothorel, La Bretagne Contre Paris, 75.
58Guin, Histoire de la Bretagne, 310.
59Personal observation, Summer of 1973, Rennes, Brittany; Summer 
of 1975, Dublin, Ireland; Winter of 1976-77, Nantes, Brittany.
60
Guin, Histoire de la Bretagne, 312.
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much controversy in its purported affiliation with the Irish Republican 
Army, a connection, as will be shown, was based more on sentiment and 
political convenience than actual heartfelt brotherhood.
Several other regionalist activities reached their pitch in the 
mid-1970's, a parallel which in some ways encouraged, and in some ways 
undermined popular support for the Breton efforts. In December, 1973, 
the Spanish Prime Minister was assassinated by a Basque separatist. 
Demands for autonomy were heard in French-controlled Catelonia in 1975, 
and in Corsica in 1976. But the French government remained unrespon­
sive. In contrast, a surprise gesture on the part of the British 
government arose when Prime Minister Harol-d Wilson announced that his 
Labor Party would support modified home-rule for both Scotland 
and Wales.^
A channel away from a seemingly encouraging future for Celtic 
nationalists in Great Britain, frustrated outbursts in Brittany con­
tinued. Protests in Dinan were held in August of 1973, and in Quimper 
and Saint-Brieuc in November. Perhaps one of the more effective pro­
tests occurred on February 13, 1974, when the FLB claimed responsibility 
for the destruction of a television transmission tower at Roc-Tredudon. 
The explosion virtually cut television transmission for all of western
Brittany. Yet, according to one source, the population was generally
62sympathetic to the perpetrators. From this act of sabotage was born
^Jack Brand, "The Rise and Fall of Scottish Nationalism," Nations 
Without A State, Charles R. Foster, editor (New York: Praeger Publish­
ing, 1980), 56.
62Guin, Histoire de la Bretagne, 332.
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the extremist Strollad or Vro, which in Breton means "the Patriots."
They also were responsible for bombing a part of a nuclear power plant
63in Finistere in August of 1975.
The early to mid-1970's saw a brief, but dynamic partnership
between the veterans of Breton activism of the 1930's and the new
generation of activists from 1968. In the spirit of the times, these
discussions often went beyond the concern of the Breton cause. The most
well-known American participant was undoubtedly Jack Kerouac, whose
On the Road became a handbook for a generation of American "counter- 
64culturalists." One of Kerouac’s last works is titled Satori in Paris,
in which he recounts his return, not so much to Paris as to his ances­
tral Breton roots. The novel, written in journal form, is peppered 
with references to his "Quebec via Brittany" stock. A critic describes 
the work as a "celebration of all the crazy, confused events of a 
writer's pilgrimage to his ancestral land, drunk in a wild extravaganza
r . » rof life.
By far the most dramatic incidents involving the Breton national­
ist movement occurred from 1975 to 1978. Between July 1, 1976 and
6 6January 1, 1977, the FLB claimed responsibility for nineteen bombings. 
One person was killed, a bystander outside the prefect's office in 
Saint-Brieuc. The stated rationale for this violence is made clear
63T,Ibid.
64Jack Kerouac, On the Road (London: Quartet Books, 1966).
^^Jack Kerouac, Satori in Paris (London: Quartet Books, 1973).
^Guin, Histoire de la Bretagne, 332.
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in a lengthy text published by the FLB in October, 1976, which reads 
in part:
Our violence is nothing more than a response to
the daily violence inflicted by the State, whose
army, police, and administrators have waged wars 
against our culture and our language.67
The text goes on to announce that this violence will continue, "in equal
proportion to the abuse which the policies of the State continued to
68inflict its own violence against the Breton people." Much of the 
Front's objection to this so-called "State violence" took on a revolu­
tionary rhetoric, and promoted the agenda of movements other than Breton 
nationalism. Other concerns in the FLB publication included environ­
mental pollution, nuclear power and weaponry, and the growth of multi­
national corporations.^
Using terms such as "commandos" and "revindication" frequently in 
their literature, the leaders of the FLB were taking a more radical tone
than many of the other Breton autonomist movements were ready to
support. In the Spring of 1977, they claimed responsibility for the 
bombing of a south wing of the castle of Versailles. The wing housed a 
collection of memorabilia from the Napoleonic period, and though very 
little was damaged, the reputation of the FLB took a dramatic turn.
After the Versailles incident, public sympathy soured and many members 
resigned in protest of the organization's increasingly violent tactics.
67Ibid., 315. 
68Ibid. , 316.
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The leaders were forced underground. Even formerly safe havens for FLB 
radicals in small Breton towns were no longer accommodating to this new 
notoriety. In the end, it was again a violent incident which marked the 
final days of the notorious Front de la Liberation de la Bretagne, when 
its leader was arrested by state police for a domestic dispute outside 
a Nantes cafe in the Spring of 1978.^
The 1970's were important for the Breton cause in a cultural sense 
as well. From 1970 to 1975, a Breton nationalist, who is also a highly 
acclaimed folk singer and recording artist, gave several concerts in 
Ireland. A virtuoso on the Celtic harp, the Irish flute, and the dulci­
mer, Alan Stivell recorded mostly in Dublin, Ireland. Appreciative of 
his Celtic heritage, Stivell nevertheless champions the frustrated call 
of Brittany most specifically. The title song of his 1971 album, 
recorded in Dublin, is called "Deliverance." Its lyrics are as haunt- 
ingly effective as any campaign rallying call:
The time of deliverance has come
Yet all thoughts of revenge are far away from our minds
We shall keep our friendship with the people of France
But we shall break down those shameful barriers
Which prevent us from looking across the sea
Those boundaries which keep us away from our closest
Brothers in Wales, Scotland, and Ireland
And we, whose name is known by the birds of Brittany
Which has been banished from all of the human languages
From all the libraries and from all the maps of the world
We, the peasants and fishermen shall open our hearts
To all the peoples of the planet Earth.^
^This information was told to me by the archivist at the Munici­
pal Archives of Vannes, Brittany, on May 17, 1985.
^*Alan Stivell, Deliverance, produced by Alan Stivell and Peter 
Rice for Keltic III Records, 1975.
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The reference to the "banished name of Brittany" refers to an unwritten, 
though much practiced tendency on the part of state officials to refer 
to the region by its five departmental names: Finistere, lie et
Vilaine, Loire-Atlantique, Cotes du Nord, and Morbihan. Even meteoro­
logical forecasts were amended to "purge" the use of the term Brittany
from official state language. Weather reports were given for the
7 2"peninsule de 1'extreme ouest-atlantique,"— not Brittany.
Though the dream of a unified Celtic homeland, be it in Wales, 
Brittany, Scotland or Ireland is admittedly unlikely, the haunting 
lyrics and melodies of Alan Stivell poetically express the compelling 
nature of this cultural identity. A review of his 1972 album, La Disque
d 1 Or ("Gold Album"), praises his uncanny ability to "extract all the
73poignancy and pathos of Celtic memory." Unfortunately for the move­
ment, and for fans of the Celtic harp and other traditional instruments, 
Stivell has suffered from the excesses of drink and of boisterous behav­
ior and has not produced an album since 1976.
In the fall of 1978, then President Valery Giscard d'Estaing made 
a trip to Brittany to support Breton cultural autonomy. In the town 
of Ploermel, Giscard asserted that there was no contradiction between 
being a Frenchman and a Breton at the same time. French unity, he said, 
should not serve to suffocate the tradition, culture, and customs of her 
various regions. Citing that the Gauls, the Romans, the Franks, the 
Celts, and the Vikings had all established themselves on French soil,
72
Personal observation, March, 1977, Nantes, Brittany.
73
Deliverance, Keltic III Records, 1975.
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Giscard maintained that modern-day France was a fusion of this diverse
heritage. Heralding the Breton effort in both World Wars as proof of
the region's pride in the glory of France, Giscard commended the Breton
tenacity in retaining its own cultural traditions. It was this unique-
74ness which makes France a richer and more diversified nation.
Giscard's appeal was both conciliatory and historic, marking the 
first time that a regional culture such as Brittany's, and, by exten­
sion, the unique cultures of the Basques, the Occitanians, and the 
Corsicans, was not viewed with consternation as a threat to French 
unity, but heralded as a boon to the cultural wealth of the nation. 
Proponents of regional autonomy, however, are leary of this concilia­
tory tone. Many Bretons continue to see a parallel connection between 
their region's plight and that of the American Indian. They relate 
to a Buffy Saint-Marie recording entitled "My Country 'Tis of Thy 
People You're Dying." One of the lyrics, charged with bitterness and 
emotion directly addresses the dominant culture and begins:
Now that my life's to be known as your heritage
Now that we're tamed, and safe behind laws
Now that our own chosen way is a novelty
Now that even the graves have been robbed
We choke on your blue, white, and scarlet hypocrisy
Hands on our hearts we salute you your v i c t o r y ^
74Guin, Histoire de la Bretagne, 339.
^Buffy Saint-Marie, Native North American Indian Child, Vanguard 
Records, 1974. Some Breton acquaintances cited this recording as signi­
ficant during my visit to Rennes, Brittany in June, 1973.
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The first three lines are the most applicable to both cultures, 
poignantly expressing a minority culture's fear that being incorporated 
into the national heritage is just one final spiritual rape. Blacks in 
the United States have voiced similar claims.
The Breton cause has been alternately championed by student revo­
lutionaries, union activists, the French Communist Party, and even the 
Government. Political endorsement has swayed from Right to Left.
Except for the brief and limited involvement of Breton activists in the 
Nazi efforts, the twentieth century has seen the Left as more receptive 
to regional reform. The term applied to these most recent efforts is 
decentralization, a trend currently in vogue in much of western Europe. 
The philosophy behind this trend, as well as some specific application 
to regional autonomy movements in countries other than France, is the 
topic of the concluding chapter.
Most of the radical elements have disappeared from Brittany. A
visit to the province in the Spring of 1985 produced no new insight into
a movement on the part of present university students, and a youthful
aide at the municipal archives in the town of Vannes had never heard of 
7 6the FLB. The Leftist Union Democratique Bretonne is doing well in 
electing their candidates to regional assemblies, but the issues are 
generally more economic than they are specifically Breton in content.^ 
The Communist Party lost much of its credibility due to its delayed
Personal interview with the archivist’s assistant, Municipal 
Archives, Vannes, Brittany, 17 May, 1985.
^Ouest-France, 9 February, 1985, 3.
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endorsement of the '68 uprising. Also, the Communist philosophy of a 
"world society," understandably, would have little appeal to the world's 
regionalists, whose goal is to maintain a separate and distinct iden­
tity. This is not to discount the inroads the Communists have made in 
the more economically destitute regions, where, at times even in 
Brittany, the appeal of a Communist economic theory has held a 
strong attraction.
The Socialist presidency of Francois Mitterrand illustrates yet 
another political irony: that a Socialist regime would champion the
rights of individual liberties over those of the State. Of course 
Brittany is no stranger to Socialist proposals. Like the rest of 
France, Brittany was relatively supportive of the Socialist regime of 
Leon Blum during the Third Republic of the 1930's. The difference 
between the Socialist regimes of Leon Blum and Francois Mitterrand is 
that the former professed the more traditional party line of a strong 
central government (much like the paternalist style of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt in the United States during the crisis of the Great Depres­
sion), whereas Mitterrand had the relative luxury of loosening the 
tether held by the State over the outlying areas.
The most recent example of the decentralization policy of the 
Mitterrand administration is the Deferre Law, named for the former 
Secretary of the Interior, Socialist Gaston Deferre. Passed in 1982, 
this law is a re-enforcement of the Loi Frey, strengthening the state's 
commitment to unravel the bureaucratic entanglements which have plagued 
the French system, thereby granting more local control over issues which 
directly affect the individual regions. The irony is that a Socialist
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government, historically supportive of a strong, protective central 
government, has put the legislative teeth into the concept of individ­
ual, regional privilege. In his comments on the passage of the Deferre 
Law, Mitterrand remarked as had Giscard before him, that the well-being
of the people of France included the right to be unique, and that much
7 8of this uniqueness stems from her diverse regional identities.
Further political irony is highlighted when it is realized that the
regional reforms brought about under a Socialist government were
actually those policies originally suggested by De Gaulle's 1969
referendum, those sabotaged by the zeal of the 1968 activists.
The politics of reform and the resulting legislation have been
slow in coming to Brittany. Advances have been made, such as lessening
the authority of the state prefect, simplifying the regulations for
government allotments of funds for regional projects, and increasing
local decision-making power. The parallels to the aspirations of many
"May of *68" slogans are apparent, as the goal of autogestion in the
79workplace and in the government have begun to take hold. Still, laws 
alone do not guarantee the preservation of a culture.
The Breton way of life, traditionally that of a peasant farmer or 
fisherman of a subsistence level, has collided with the twentieth cen­
tury economy. The strange coalitions discussed in this chapter: stu­
dents and farmers, factory workers and the rural Catholic Church, are 
the legacy of the 1968 uprising. They have had both a positive and
78
Le Monde, 7 March, 1983.
79Loring, "What Happened in France," postscript, 13.
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potentially detrimental effect on the Breton community. In terms of 
political expediency, such consolidation has been effective. The strike 
at the factory in Lorient would never have been as successful for the 
unions had the Breton Chuirch not lent its encouragement.
The farmers' Milk War in 1972 would never have received as much 
press had not the university students championed the cause. Yet poli­
tical expediency can exact a price. A certain diluting of the histori­
cal distinctions between peasant farmer and the university-educated is 
perhaps a good thing, yet it seems naive to presume that, in the 
exchange, the assimilation will be of equal proportions. Much of the 
loss of traditional culture in the twentieth century is probably 
inevitable. Witness this exchange between two Breton farmers, who found 
it impossible to discuss modern everyday farmer tasks in their native 
Breton. The highlighted words are in modern French, the rest in tradi­
tional Breton:
"Eur tri ag tracteur a ked zul?" g^
"An hini cultivation eur zo condensceur."
A Breton visitor this past summer (July, 1985) was a native of a 
small coastal town on the outskirts of Nantes. She told of her disap­
pointment over a new rural practice called renombrement. This was a 
new government policy of land consolidation, which required that small 
land owners remove the ancient stone walls which delineated their tiny 
fields. It was the government's hope that these more open fields would 
lend themselves to more efficient cultivation. According to our house-
80Guin, Histoire de la Bretagne, 339.
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guest, the change in topography caused such erosion along the rain-
soaked fields that the government withdrew the project after a few
years. -In the interim, however, much of the original charm of the
81stone-enclosed fields in many areas was destroyed.
A Breton writer composed the following poem in 1971, warning the
Breton farmer of the danger of too close an acceptance of the twentieth
century, including the modern-day factory worker:
Et qui te jettera la pierre 
Si tu te separes de ta terre 
N'as-tu pas peur de la misere 
Veux-tu rester celibataire 
Les ouvriers des arsenaux 
N'ont pas ces soucis sur le dos 
Et ils ont du pain sur la planche 
A faire des armes pour la France 
Tu deviendras betail toi-meme
A l'etable des h o m m e s . 8 2
Paraphrased, it states:
And if you were separated from your land 
Wouldn’t you fear upon whose hand 
You would depend?
Or would you be like the worker in the factory 
Whose profit depends on France's armory?
Is it better to supply a stranger's arsenal gg
Than to live off the beasts in the farmer's stall?
The singer later stopped performing the song, upon requests by union
spokesmen that it was unnecessarily antagonistic toward blue-
collar workers.^
81Personal interview with Marie-Anne Gravouil, Omaha,
15 July, 1985.
82Guin, Histoire de la Bretagne, 337.
83
My translation.
84Guin, Histoire de la Bretagne, 337.
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Granted, the adaptability question of a proud peasant existence in 
the twentieth century is certainly not unique to Brittany, France. In 
many ways the raising of social consciousness, including that of the 
various new constituencies just discussed, has come only as a result of 
rapid economic change and social upheaval. The past twenty years have 
produced tremendous change, much of it positive, to the everyday econo­
mic concerns of the average Breton. But has it come at too great a 
psychological, or spiritual, cost? The philosophical and sociological 
concerns of maintaining a viable minority culture in the late twentieth 
century hold a significance well beyond the Breton movement. The 
dangers, lessons, and opportunities of autonomist efforts in other 
regions of western Europe will be the theme of the final, conclud­
ing chapter.
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CONCLUSION
In 1975, American sociologist Michael Hechter published his 
Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Develop­
ment from 1536-1966. Though Brittany is barely mentioned, the work 
is significant to this discussion for two reasons: The term ’’internal
colonialism" has entered the vocabulary of the present-day discussion 
of ethnic activists, and, the author has applied it to twentieth century 
democracies. These final pages of this study will attempt to assess in 
what capacity Brittany fits into the "Celtic fringe" of northwestern 
France, and what, if anything, can be done to improve her situation.
Two departures from the historical approach taken thus far will 
help in this assessment. First is a discussion of the Breton plight 
from a sociological perspective, citing recent works by French, British, 
and American sociologists and political scientists. Second, nationalist 
resurgence in other regions of Europe will be discussed in the hope that 
such parallel movements will provide added insight into the plight of 
the modern-day ethnic minorities. It is hoped that a more general 
analysis of the problems of minority cultures, coupled with a comparison 
of Breton autonomist efforts to others currently active, will clarify in 
what ways Brittany is unique, and in what ways Brittany can serve as a 
case study for many twentieth century cultures caught in the periphery 
of the modern-day state.
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A definition of terms must precede this discussion. Hechter 
perceived the "periphery” as any region in a present-day nation-state 
which is administered by a "dogmatically asserted racial, ethnic, or 
cultural superiority."^ The periphery becomes a colony when this 
"superior culture" imposes its will upon an indigenous, and often 
economically subordinate people. Historically, the creation of a "peri­
phery" in France could only occur once the modern-day state was created. 
Political scientist Sidney Tarrow, in his comparative treatment of
French and Italian governments, rightly cites Napoleon as the architect
2
of western European state administrations. The extent of the centrali­
zation was a radical idea, which championed the national will, as 
embodied in the state, as transcending the particular interests of the 
provinces. Tarrow distinguishes between the Italian and French adminis­
trative styles (though both are based on the Napoleonic code), as a
3
clientaliste approach in Rome, and a dirigiste approach in Paris. But 
the claim that the Italian government operates on a more cooperative 
level, perhaps suggesting that there is a collegial basis of communica­
tion between Rome and the outlying regions of Italy, is contested. 
Revolts in the German-speaking South Tyrol section of northern Italy in 
in the late 1960’s and in Sicily attest to the fact that regional
Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism; The Celtic Fringe in 
British National Development From 1536-1966 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1975), 30.
2
Sidney Tarrow, Between Center and Periphery (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1977), 252.
3Ibid., 51.
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assimilation in Italy has not gone as smoothly as Tarrow suggests.
Yet, the French propensity to direct from above has made Paris much more 
often the target of regional resistance efforts in recent years.
In French Corsica, Corsican nationalists have claimed responsi­
bility for 298 explosions, including an attack on an Air France 707 in 
1976.^ Though no one was killed in that incident, three deaths resulted 
from separate bombings in 1977, and three more in 1980. The trial of 
those held responsible, leaders of the clandestine Front de la Libera­
tion Nationaliste de Corsica, was widely publicized. Due to increasing 
economic unrest in France and in Corsica, the defendants received the 
support of the major French unions, the Confederation Generale de 
Travail and the Force Ouvriere.^ Once sentenced, the convicted prison­
ers began a hunger strike which, as was the case with Bobby Sands in 
Ireland, stirred widespread public concern. In both cases, the Catholic 
Church attempted to intervene as a humane intermediary. Unlike Bobby
Sands, however, the Corsican defendants were force-fed and remain in
_ . . . 7
a Parisian prison.
Sociologists and political scientists find parallels in several 
characteristics which isolate the French from the Italian and
4
Flavia Pristinger, "Ethnic Conflict and Modernization in the 
South Tyrol," Nations Without A State, Charles R. Foster, ed. (New York: 
Praeger Publishing, 1980), 153-188.
^Peter Savigear, "Corsica and the French State," Nations Without 
A State, 130.
^Ibid.
7Ibid.
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English administrations. Unlike the French system of uniformity and 
overriding adherence to hierarchical command from Paris, the British 
government tolerates a somewhat larger measure of regional autonomy in 
Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. Each region operates under a 
separate constitution, though bound by allegiance to the British throne. 
In many ways, the lack of an overt directive from London has allowed 
residents of the British periphery to develop their own, and in many
g
ways, more genuine, loyalty to the State.
The phrase "British Empire" was first coined as an accolade of
9
admiration and pride, by a Welshman in 1536. England and Wales defined 
their interests as one and the same, linked by ties of married nobility, 
for centuries. Modern-day Wales, however, is best described as the 
scarred creation of the industrial revolution. The transformation of 
the Welsh countryside from 1870 to 1900 was a consequence of the sudden 
need for massive amounts of both coal and iron ore to supply the steel 
foundries of northwest Europe. The resulting urbanization and cheap 
labor influx gave Wales a higher mass immigration rate than even the 
United States experienced during that time.^ Hechter cites Wales as 
the supreme example of a periphery's systematic exploitation to meet 
the needs of the colonizing force. With many of the mines now abandoned 
and a mounting unemployment rate, present-day Wales is, in many ways, an
g
Hechter, Internal Colonialism, 80. Hechter acknowledges, of 
course, that Northern Ireland is ruled by the United Kingdom.
9
John Osmond, "Wales in the 1980's," Nations Without A State, 45. 
^Hechter, Internal Colonialism, 286.
132
orphaned industrial wasteland. Though there are occasional expressions
of Welsh nationalism, such as the bombing of an English television tower
in 1978, Welsh autonomy has never maintained the pitch that many other
regional efforts have enjoyed.^ Its sluggish, industrial economy has
firmly tied Wales into the British political system; Welsh voters have
consistently hoped to improve their lot by supporting the British Labour
12Party, not by expressions of autonomy.
The rise and fall of Scottish nationalism unfolded in the 1960's 
and 1970's. Scotland was separate from England, complete with its own 
parliament, though sharing a King, until 1707. It had its own legal 
system, championed the Presbyterian Church over the Anglican, and 
boasted a rich literary tradition including Robert Burns and Sir Walter 
Scott. Many students of regional nationalism find the literary tradi­
tion of the native culture to be a tremendous source of pride which 
often serves as an impetus for nationalist resurgence. Yeats is cited 
as serving this purpose in Ireland. Though the native Gaelic dialect 
is no longer spoken in Scotland, a distinct language is not a prerequi­
site for a nationalist feeling. As a scholar of Scottish history 
reminds, sharing the English language with the Mother Country did not 
reduce the resentment of the American colonists, nor did it prevent the 
American War of Independence. In the late 1960's, the Scottish National 
Party proposed further degrees of autonomy from Great Britain. But the
^Osmond, "Wales in the 1980’s,” Nations Without A State, 45. 
L2Ibid.
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measure was soundly defeated, even in the Scottish districts, in 1979. 
Political autonomy, once again, was not the expressed desire of the 
periphery population.
A comparison of the Breton autonomy movement with that in Ireland 
is in order. Such a parallel would seem likely, since both regions are 
the homeland of a native, indigenous Celtic race who finds itself on the 
outside, looking in at the "foreigners" who are now in power. Both 
regions have suffered economic hardships, some of which are attributable 
to their respective state policies concerning trade regulations and 
price-fixing of regionally produced commodities. Autonomist activities 
in both Brittany and Ireland increased dramatically at the turn of the 
century, reaching a height of activity in the World War I era, and 
resumed a high level of visibility in both regions in the 1930's.
Though the leadership of the Breiz Atao ("Brittany Above All") and the 
Irish Sinn Fein ("Ourselves Alone") did not know one another, their 
movements paralleled one another in both pitch and tone throughout much 
of the twentieth century.
Breiz Atao leader Olivier Mordrel attributed his inspiration to 
spearhead the Breton autonomist movement of the 1920's to the example 
of Ireland during the Easter uprising in Dublin of 1916. Though the 
political activism of both regions has an uncanny parallel rhythm, from 
Celestin Laine's exile to Ireland in the late 1940's to the Front de 
la Liberation de la Bretagne's tacit support of the Irish Republican
13Jack Brand, "The Rise and Fall of Scottish Nationalism," Nations 
Without A State, 42.
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Army in the early 1970's, the link seems to be more coincidental than
evidence of a concerted partnership. The "troubles" in Ireland, as the
natives put it, are far more charged with religious rivalries and deeply
rooted social prejudices than the Bretons have experienced. It is
extremely disconcerting to read this account of a Cambridge University
history professor, visiting Ireland in the late nineteenth century:
I am haunted by the human chimpanzees I saw along 
that hundred miles of horrible country. I don’t 
believe they are our fault. But to see white 
chimpanzees is dreadful; if they were black, one 
would not feel it so much, but their skins, except 
where tanned by exposure, are’as white as ours.^
Distinctions of color are not a prerequisite for racism. An ethnic 
pecking order has been part of the internal dynamic of the majority of 
cultures from time immemorial. As a scholar of Celtic history observed, 
by the seventeenth century, "an Englishman who did not look down on a 
Scotsman would have been only half an Englishman; a Scotsman who did not 
hate an Englishman would not have been a Scotsman at all."^
Ethnic chauvinism within the minority culture also plays a role. 
Community rivalries often prevented the possibility of regional unity in 
Brittany. Oddly, it is sometimes the more subtle distinctions, such as 
different dialects of a shared minority language, which foster some of 
the most vehement ethnic chauvinism. A Breton historian allowed that he 
is more at ease visiting transplanted Bretons in Paris who are origi­
nally from his own commune than he is traveling the few kilometers to
Hechter, Internal Colonialism, xvi. 
15Ibid., 32.
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a different section of Brittany. How one defines a member of the ethnic 
minority in question can become a delicate task. One recent scholarly 
study went so far as to request blood tests to determine the genetic 
make-up of the people under scrutiny.^
Ironically, some of the most divergent of ethnic groups have 
learned to co-exist. An example of such an unlikely alliance is the 
Jura province in Switzerland. Upper Jura is mostly German-speaking and 
Protestant. Lower Jura is French-speaking and Roman Catholic. Since 
language and religion have historically been the root of the most pro­
nounced ethnic rivalries, it is significant to note that the residents 
of the Jura have voiced only minor disputes, most of them channelled 
through diplomatic means in the Council of Europe sessions held in 
Brussels and Strasbourg in 1972 and 1973.^
Final mention must be made of the Basques, since their activism,
much like the Irish Catholics of Northern Ireland and the nationalists
of Corsica, has in many ways paralleled that of the Bretons. The
Basques, like the Bretons, have a unique language. And though the
Basque population has resided for centuries in the Pyrenees mountains,
the modern-day nation-state has cut this mountain range in two: the
northern slope belongs to France, the southern slope to Spain. Only
18about ten percent of the Basque community live on the French side.
16Robert P. Clark, "Euzkadi: Basque Nationalism in Spain Since
the Civil War," Nations Without A State, 77.
^Kurt Mayer, "The Jura Conflict: Ethnic Tensions in Switzerland,"
Nations Without A State, 201.
18Clark, "Euzkadi: Basque Nationalism in Spain," Nations Without
A State, 76.
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The Basques are a fascinating study, nonetheless, and despite, or
perhaps thanks to widely publicized violent acts, they have become a
well-known case study of modern-day ethnic autonomy. According to cave
paintings and other archaeological evidence, the Basques have resided
in this same region of Europe since 5,000 B.C., and some anthropologists
estimate their arrival to have been as early as 20,000 B.C. They are
the undisputed indigenous race of western Europe, followed by the Celts,
19who were their first, though unsuccessful, invaders.
Twentieth century resistance to Spanish rule perhaps received its 
most symbolic impetus after the bombing of the village of Guernica in 
April, 1937. A clandestine agreement between Spanish nationalist leader 
Francisco Franco and Adolf Hitler allowed German war planes to test 
their effectiveness on this Basque civilian population. Pablo Picasso 
created a mammoth memorial to the victims in his abstract painting, 
Guernica, on display in the Metropolitan Museum of Modern Art on condi­
tion that it not be returned to Spain until Franco’s death. Franco died
20in 1978, and the painting is now in Madrid.
The native language of the Basques, Euskera, was forbidden by the 
Spanish State until 1950. Even the teaching of it as a second language 
was illegal, and all Basque proper names were erased from public docu­
ments and replaced by Spanish ones. Once Vatican II permitted the use 
of the vernacular in Mass, Euskera was commonly used for religious
19
Ibid., 79.
20The painting has come to symbolize the atrocities of war upon 
an innocent, civilian population.
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ceremonies, though its use outside of Church was still discouraged by
Spanish authorities.^
The 1960's uprising fueled the activism of Basque youth. In that
year, a Basque student who refused to stop for a police roadblock was
shot and killed. In retaliation, the local Spanish police chief was
killed. The violence accelerated rapidly, as thirty-six fatalities
were blamed on Basque nationalist activities in 1974-75, sixty in 1978,
and over one hundred in 1979. The most famous casualty was that of
Spanish Premier Luis Carrero Blanco who was killed by a car bomb 
22in 1973.
It seems a quirk of history that the more violent and reckless a 
movement, often the more world attention it gains. A 1977 statute 
granted the Basques a "pre-autonomy status" from the Spanish government. 
It provides for an independent Basque president, parliament, legal, and 
judicial system. Rumblings of Basque dissatisfaction continue, however. 
The Irish in 1921 and the Quebecois in 1978 were admittedly more suc­
cessful in procuring such autonomist measures from their respec- 
23
tive governments.
Brittany has enjoyed a mixed bag of success. Though Mitterrand 
has championed the cause of decentralization, heralding a curious mix 
of autogestion in the workplace, while nationalizing major French
21 Clark, "Euzkadi; Basque Nationalism in Spain," Nations Without 
A State, 82.
22Ibid., 93.
23Ibid., 98.
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industries to form a highly centralized economy, the Breton situation 
may be more complex than the Deferre Law or any other recent legislation 
can set aright. There is a danger in becoming too dependent on legisla­
tive solutions for what are oftentimies complex and delicate problems.
In France, in particular, the legislative experts often serve only to 
perpetuate an administrative system already saturated with bureau­
cratic expertise.
French sociologist Michel Crozier describes governmental opera­
tions by committee in his native country when he laments that "everybody
24
takes care of everything, but nobody listens to anybody else." His 
translator, William Beer, called the French administrative system a 
"technocratic caste," immune and insensitive to the initiative and needs 
of the periphery. Many of the regional committees discussed thus far, 
which have been granted governmental sanction, such as the Comite 
d'etude et de liaison des interets bretons (CELIB) have functioned 
primarily as economic planning task forces, and have not voiced regional 
concerns beyond that. President Giscard d'Estaing was blamed for reduc­
ing the scope of these regionalist think-tanks from De Gaulle's far more 
comprehensive goal of promoting "regional expression" through­
out France.^
Many sociologists who have written on this topic, paint a dismal 
portrait of the potential for an economically viable regional culture
24Michael Crozier, Strategies for Change: The Future of French
Society (Boston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1982), 79.
25Eugene Weber, Peasants Into Frenchmen (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1976), 33.
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which operates independently of the modern-day state. Max Weber claimed
in his Economy and Society that the "modern economic system requires a
public order which functions promptly and predictably," and went on to
say that the most successful economic enterprise will be a monopoly of 
2 6the state. French scholar and former editor of L * Express magazine
Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber wrote a best-selling book which lamented
the helplessness of the French regions in his Le Pouvoir regional in
1971. Many French publications written by authors with a socialist
bent, have been outspoken proponents of regionalism, including Jean-
Pierre Richierlot's La France en miettes (1976) and Jean Francois
27
Deniau's L'Europe Interdite (1979).
American sociologist Mark Kesselman credits much of France's 
tendency to overcentralize to a national personality that has a 
propensity to yield to authority. A French citizen commonly shirks 
most civic responsibility and is rarely chastised for so doing, 
since the French definition of democracy means a citizen is free 
to do, or not do, whatever he likes. Most French citizens are 
perfectly willing to concede their voice in civic matters to the 
person of mayor, who, in turn, curries the favor of the departmental 
prefect, the Parisian-appointed link to the State. Thus the mayor, 
the governmental figure most directly linked to the people, has a
26Max Weber, Economy and Society, quoted in Hechter, 313.
27Robert Ramsay, The Corsican Time Bomb (Manchester, UK: 
Manchester University Press, 1983), 225.
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professional stake in the present system, and actively cultivates his
28affiliation with the Parisian elite.
Proposed solutions include prohibiting the holding of a plurality
of French elective offices, a long practiced tradition which further
entrenches elected notables in a perpetually sustained network of
political maneuvering. Plural office-holding is especially common
among the more ambitious mayors, who may be elected to Deputy seats in
the middle of their mayoral terms, and who often devote more energy to
their more prestigious Parisian posts than they do to their local 
29offices. Not always is the intent so self-aggrandizing, however.
Oftentimes the most effective means to guarantee a favorable response
for a regional project is to first make one's way up the political
ladder, and all political ladders in France lean toward Paris.
A Breton writer, Pierre-Jakez Helias, published his autobiography
in 1978. It serves as a delightful account of a traditional Breton 
30upbringing. He champions no specific Breton autonomist group; 
indeed, no regionalist groups are even mentioned by name. Yet many 
of his thoughts are worth conveying, as he, perhaps more than any 
sociologist, political scientist, or historian, best conveys what 
Brittany was, is, and is becoming. Surprisingly, the author is 
generally optimistic.
Mark Kesselman, The Ambiguous Consensus: A Study of Local
Government in France (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967).
29
Ibid., 95-6.
30Pierre-Jakez Helias, The Horse of Pride (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1978).
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His foremost concern is the loss of the Breton language. Breton
was forbidden in all schools until 1961. Any student caught speaking
it was called a vache ("cow"), and this derogatory remark was often
accompanied by a necklace with a cow trinket which the student was
forced to wear around his neck. He could rid himself of the necklace
only by catching a fellow student speaking Breton, thus instilling in
31childhood a policing mentality toward his own heritage.
One of the most poignant examples of the crippling effect that
the prohibition of Breton had was that the old people, before Vatican
32II, were forced to "pray in blunders" in their broken French. Old
women were heard voicing the concern that God would not be able to
distinguish the Bretons' prayers, who were now made to speak in a
language whose words were no more than "half-empty boxes" to the Breton
faithful. The Breton priests were often just as uncomfortable with
their own mastery of French. The singing rang hollow. The elderly
33remained silent. Mass was an embarrassment, not a joy.
Brittany had once been a veritable outdoor museum of religious 
relics, not only Catholic shrines to Mary (many of which were for­
merly statues of the Duchesse Anne), but also mysterious Druid 
ruins along the southern and western coasts. Many are now delapidated
31TK•jIbid. , x n .
32Ibid., 339.
33Ibid.
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and defaced, and some remaining have made their way into the curios of
34
the world of the tourist trade.
Tourism has taken its toll on the picturesque corners of the world,
and Brittany is no exception. Even before the strong dollar and the
ensuing influx of Americans, along with many other travelers from other
prosperous nations around the world, Brittany had been a long-time
favorite of the vacationing French. This tradition has increased ever
since the French state initiated the conge, or five weeks paid vacation,
four weeks of which are invariably taken by nearly every French family
in the month of August. The "August birds" are especially annoying to
the Breton farmer and fisherman, who often do not understand how whole
families are able to take a full month off work, when they themselves
are at their busiest in the fields and on the fishing boats. The bad
feelings accelerate as the Parisian "kodakers" take pictures of the
fishermen at work, while the cityfolk themselves often bedeck themselves
in so-called Breton garb, looking more like misplaced sailors from a
nineteenth century operetta than authentic Breton fishermen. English
tourists, took on the name of les homards, "the lobsters," since they
often burned themselves to a bright red crisp once they planted them-
35selves on the Breton beaches off the English Channel.
While visiting the Foret of Paimpont last Spring, a misty, moss- 
covered forest in central Brittany where Merlin the wizard is said to 
still be living, the mystical nature of the area looked remarkably 
intact. Innkeepers warned that by mid-summer, on the other hand, the 
area would be flooded with the littering school children from the cities. 
35Personal observation, Saint Malo, Brittany, Summer, 1973.
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Helias has not much better to say of the social scientists, mostly
Americans, who have come to study the plight of present-day Brittany.
He wonders if their arrival is "a portent of our imminent demise." In
uncharacteristic cynicism, this Breton racconteur welcomes the visitors
of the "new social sciences" as a mandate to "put our affairs in order
36before leaving room for the new tenants." In a tongue-in-cheek futur­
istic scenario, he refers to Brittany as "QX 29, an outlying suburb of
37the European section F 75, formerly called Gaul."
The Breton horse-drawn plows have been replaced by tractors, and 
life's rhythm in Brittany, as in many parts of the world, has had to 
keep time. Much of the local color has remained, however, as the local 
cuisine can attest. Breton cuisine has one notable export: the crepe.
While it is the dessert crepe that has made its way to the fancy restau­
rants of Paris and beyond, it is a much hardier version which is enjoyed 
in Brittany. More accurately called a gallette, this whole wheat crepe 
is speckled with browned butter, laden with ham, cheese, fresh vege­
tables, or fresh seafood, rolled, and eaten as the main course. It 
should be complemented by a wine-sized bottle of local cider, which is 
a fermented ale, rather than the sweet apple cider consumed in the 
United States. Calvados, an apple-based brandy, is occasionally sipped, 
but it originates from next-door Normandy. The Bretons have their own 
after-dinner creation, a honey-based liqueur called Chuchenne. It is
36Ibid., 345.
37Ibid., 344.
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as smooth as the cider is thirst-quenching— and both are guaranteed to 
liven up a dinner conversation.
Other Breton exports include lobsters and oysters. The Bretons 
keep for themselves the shellfish they most prefer, mussels. Mussels 
are steamed in a garlic and parsley broth, then eaten with the fingers, 
using the smooth black shell of each mussel as a spoon. Butter cookies 
under the trade names Les Gavottes, or Bisquits Nantais are packaged in 
colorful tins and shipped round the world. The authentic bread of the
provinces is a heavy black peasant bread. This is often spread with
i  ^ ~ - 38lard or a turnip pate.
Perhaps such details seem inappropriate to historical research.
Yet the smell of garlic poultices, the food, drink, music, and legends 
of a region often have a far longer life than the name of this or that 
regional organization. It is said that, of all the human senses, the 
sense of smell is the most lingering. Brittany's briny sea air, the 
smoking butter of the creperies, and the mossy mist of her moist forest 
floors will endure, even if the autonomist efforts do not.
But what lessons do some two hundred years of resurgent regional­
ism in Brittany hold? What has made the other Celtic regions of Ireland, 
Scotland, Cornwall and Wales develop differently, and, to varying 
degrees, achieve ..success or suffer failure? And why has regional frus­
tration reached such a fevered pitch in recent decades that bombings in 
Corsica and casualties in the pays Basque are the highest in years?
Could there be clues in the study of Breton autonomist efforts which
38My own observation, June, 1973.
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might seem to resolve potential trouble-spots in other parts of the 
world? There is a temptation to hope this noble a solution might come 
from these efforts, but each minority culture is unique, and each is 
operating in a twentieth century state which poses its own constraints. 
The needs, frustrations, and goals of one ethnic minority may be 
directly opposed to the needs and goals of another minority culture 
somewhere else in the world.
Such a discussion can become extremely complex. Assimilation is 
a term that was introduced by sociologists. It was generally held that 
ethnic minorities must be welcomed into the majority mainstream. Such 
an assimilation would be proof positive that ethnic prejudices were 
overcome, and that the melting pot, at least so went the terminology in 
the United States, could melt down all differences and fashion a new 
identity, that of the everyday, all-American citizen. True cultural 
assimilation is a rarity, and the theory, since it seldom is realized 
in practice, tends to become a cover for the dominant race to fool 
itself into thinking it is prejudice-free, while the minority races are 
asked to deny themselves their distinctive characteristics, or risk 
appearing un-American. But once again, application of the above discus­
sion to actual trouble spots in the world confuses the issue still 
further. Black activists, for example, directly challenged the assimi­
lation solution to the ethnic minority issue by championing the unique 
contents simmering at the bottom of the melting pot with the "Black is 
Beautiful" campaign.
Perhaps the best known assimilation tragedy is the case of the 
American Indian. As mentioned earlier, Breton activists have voiced.
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what they feel to be a parallel between American Indian history and 
their own. Both are indigenous populations, both have been periodically 
forbidden their languages, and both have suffered the many, sometimes 
subtle indignations of becoming assimilated into the collective heritage 
of the dominant race. For the American Indian, the Dawes Severalty Act 
of 1887, though backed by many liberal reform groups and other self- 
proclaimed "Friends of the Indian," secured for the Indian a new phe­
nomenon: individual ownership of land. The result was that the tribal
lands were fragmented, the tribes dispersed, and, most significantly, 
the way Indians traditionally saw themselves in relationship to the 
land, as stewards rather than owners, was forever altered.
Though it might be tempting to accuse all white civilizations of 
being inept perpetrators of inappropriate cultural norms, it would be 
just as unfair to portray the minority cultures as voicing a united 
expression of resistance. Part of the price of increased awareness of 
the world’s differences, is that one risks oversimplification in order 
to respond with what one might hope to be a "timely solution." The 
Dawes Act was such an oversimplification. The value system projected 
was not shared by the target culture. The target culture, in fact, con­
sisted of many sub-cultures; individual tribes who were often historical
enemies, were now lumped together by the dominant culture in an attempt
39to deal more efficiently with the "Indian Problem."
39Robert V. Rine, The American West: An Interpretive History
(Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1984), 218.
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Though the parallel is inexact, the on-going struggle of the 
American Indian Movement to maintain a sense of cultural integrity, 
while securing economic survival, echoes the Breton struggle as well. 
Both cultures are unique, and both are full of contradictions. Since 
the first Breton migration from Cornwall in 600 A.D. to the present-day, 
efforts to maintain Celtic distinctiveness in France have persisted. It 
has only been since the French Revolution, however, that these efforts 
resulted in formal organizations promoting cultural autonomy.
In the late eighteenth century, the Club Breton membership was the 
elite of Breton nobility, whose advanced education allowed it the luxury 
of entertaining the enlightened ideals of the Jacobins. Once the Revo­
lution was underway, however, many of these same Breton nobles were 
targeted as enemies of the Revolution, and, strengthened by the force­
ful presence of the Catholic Church in the province, staged Counter- 
Revolutionary revolts throughout the region. Thus, in the closing years 
of the eighteenth century, Brittany was seen as championing first Jacob­
inism, and then the landed conservatism of the Right and the Church.
Throughout the nineteenth century the Breton cause was championed 
by the Right, though, once again, a precise profile of Breton regional 
organizations is difficult to compile. The only regional organization 
to thrive in the nineteenth century, the Association Bretonne, served 
mainly as a cultural society interested in preserving the Breton lore 
and language. But political activism was an outgrowth of that organi­
zation, as the prohibition of this cherished language, and the eventual 
prohibition of the organization itself, drove the partici­
pants underground.
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The twentieth century Breton autonomists drew on these unresolved 
issues of language and cultural heritage, and drew support, as their 
ancestors had two centuries earlier, from both the Right and the Left. 
The resurgent activism of the Breiz Atao, its leadership tempted into 
collaboration with Nazi Germany during World War II, condemned Brittany 
to a reputation of Right-Wing fanaticism. Two decades later, the 
leadership profile of Breton autonomy is that of highly educated profes­
sionals, most of them Left-of-Center politically, who formed the CELIB. 
The late 1960's ushered in a new, if unlikely coalition between Breton 
farmers and Parisian university students. In the 1980’s, President 
Francois Mitterrand championed efforts of decentralization, though the 
political orientation of his Socialist Party, in true Jacobin tradition, 
has been highly centralized. The evolution of Breton autonomy provides 
no clear profile of political orientation, social class, education, 
or profession.
One thing is certain. Minority cultures cannot be expected to fit 
into the assimilationists’ scheme of an undifferentiated world. When a 
government denies minority cultures their identity, members of such 
cultures often are driven underground in order to keep alive such basic 
parts of their heritage as language and religion. When no legitimate 
sanction is granted by the outside world for the minority's participa­
tion in these practices, such participation itself becomes a political 
act of defiance. An indigenous lifestyle thus becomes an act 
of sedition.
In a simpler world scheme, the lessons seem clear. The white 
Afrikaaners should leave South Africa, the Palestinians should be given
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a homeland, and the American Indian would again be seen roaming the 
Plains. But history cannot be undone. The solutions must look to the 
future, not the past. Comparable minority movements do have their 
parallels, and it would be a fine thing if some future terrorist act, 
born of the frustration and defiance of some yet unknown minority 
culture, could be prevented if dominant cultures recognized the legiti­
macy of the sub-cultures over whom they have administrative control.
But the focus of this study has been Brittany, France. And, in many 
ways, the historical inconsistencies and lack of written material have 
made this study reveal more enigmas than it has solved.
Assessing the role of the French government has been an easier 
task. It has become quite fashionable in recent years to publish 
critical assessments of French administrative bureaucracy. Decentrali­
zation in industry and government has become the uncontested theme of 
politicians and political scientists. Economic planning committees and 
regional think tanks, now with government sanction, convene to assure 
that their region will remain a viable part of France, while keeping a 
measure of self-direction. The "trouble with France," as has been 
alluded, is that Frenchmen often are distrustful of political solutions 
to their problems. This or that committee is often seen as one more cog 
in the slowly moving bureaucratic wheel.
In Brittany, land of rugged coasts and misty sea air, such com­
mittee sessions often seem a world away. Surprisingly, many Bretons are 
not particularly saddened by the passing of the old ways. The elderly 
especially, who now must speak a staccatoed Breton, peppered with words 
in modern French where there are no equivalents in their native tongue
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for many twentieth century phenomena, seem content to live in an 
imperfect world. It seems to be the younger generation of Breton 
activists, many now struggling to learn Breton at the university, who 
are angry at the changes and impurities that modern society has brought. 
They will be the frustrated committee members of the future.
An old Breton paid the women of the world a compliment when he 
said that men only bear witness to the surface of things; it is the 
women who are the custodians of profundity. He went on to warn that 
such a study as is found within these pages would only be a disappoint­
ment. He related an old Breton adage that said it takes seven years,
40seven weeks, and seven days to know with whom you are dealing. The
unlikelihood that an outsider could truly grasp "the essential element
of things" was further magnified by distances in geography, language,
age, and culture. That the essential human element would remain elusive
to all students of the periphery was somehow comforting. It echoed
Saint-Exupery's "L'essentiel est invisible pour les yeux," or "The
41essential is invisible to the eye." In a province filled with silent 
Druid ruins and legends of sunken civilizations, the warning rang true.
40Personal observation, Ploermel, Brittany, May, 1984.
41Antoine de Saint-Exupery, Le Petit Prince (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1946), 47.
151
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ARCHIVAL HOLDINGS
Breiz Atao materials, Archives Departementales du Morbihan, Vannes 
France.
Breiz Atao materials, Archives Nationales de France, Paris, France. 
Reference F7 13244
ARTICLES
Ambler, John S. "The Politics of University Reform: Ten Years After
May," Contemporary French Civilization, 78, June, 1974, 42-47.
Brand, Jack. "The Rise and Fall of Scottish Nationalism," Nations 
Without A State, Charles R. Foster, editor. New York: Praeger
Publishing, 1980, 29-43.
Clark, Robert P. "Euzkadi: Basque Nationalism in Spain," Nations
Without A State, Charles R. Foster, editor. New York: Praeger
Publishing, 1980,. 75-99.
Doan, J. "Legend of the Sunken City in Welsh and Breton Tradition," 
Folklore, 92, January, 1981, 77-83.
Fleuriot, L. and P. R. Giot. "Early Brittany," Antiquity, 51, July, 
1977, 106-16.
Gordon, Milton M. "Assimilation in America: Theory and Reality,"
The National Temper, Part II, Lawrence W. Levine and Robert 
Middlekauff, editors. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich,
1972, 266-86.
Lefebvre, Georges. "The Place of the Revolution in the Agrarian 
History of France," Rural Society in France: Selections from
the Annales, Robert Forster, editor. Baltimore: Johns Hupkius
University Press, 1977, 31-49.
152
Luilliot, Paul. "A Manifesto: The Defense and Illustration of
Local History," Rural Society in France: Selections from the
Annales, Robert Forster-, editor. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1977, 6-30.
Machin, H. "Traditional Patterns of French Local Government,"
Local Government in Britain and France: Problems and Prospects,
Jacques Lagroye and Vincent Wright, editors. New York: Holmes
& Meier, 1983, 52-66.
Mayer, Kurt. "The Jura Conflict: Ethnic Tensions in Switzerland,"
Nations Without A State, Charles R. Foster, editor. New York: 
Praeger Publishing, 1980, 189-208.
Molner, Thomas. "D-Day at Brooklyn College," National Review, 243, 
30 January, 1968, 22-28.
Osmond, John. "Wales in the 1980's," Nations Without A State,
Charles R. Foster, editor. New York: Praeger Publishing, 1980,
44-72.
Prisinger, Flavia. "Ethnic Conflict and Modernization in the South 
Tyrol," Nations Without A State, Charles R. Foster, editor. New 
York: Praeger Publishing, 1980, 153-185.
Savigear, Peter, "Corsica and the French State," Nations Without A 
State, Charles R. Foster, editor. New York: Praeger Publishing,
1980, 116-135.
Soboul, Albert. "Persistence of 'Feudalism' in the Rural Society of 
Nineteenth-Century France, Rural Society in France: Selections
from the Annales, Robert Forster, editor. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1977, 50-71.
Thoenig, J.C. "Local Government Institutions and Contemporary 
Evolution of French Society," Local Government in Britain and 
France, Jacques Lagroye and Vincent Wright, editors. New York: 
Holmes and Meier, 1983, 74-100.
BOOKS
Berger, Suzanne. Peasants Against Politics: Rural Organization in
Brittany from 1911 to 1967. Cambridge, Massachussetts: Harvard
University Press, 1972.
Bothorel, Jean. La Bretagne contre Paris. Paris: Editions de la
Table Ronde, 1969.
153
Braudel, Fernand. Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and
Capitalism. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977.
______ . Capitalism and Material Life, i4OQ-i80Q. New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1973.
Brekelien, Yann. La Bretagne qu^ il faut sauver. Quimper:
Brekilien, 1972.
Cerny,Philip G. Social Movements and Protest in France. London: 
Frances Pinter, 1982.
Chaffard, Georges. Les orages de mai. Paris: Calmahn-Levy, 1968.
Chevalier, J.J. Les institutions et des regimes politiques de la 
France Moderne. Paris: Librairie Dalloz, 1967.
Chapman, Brian. The Prefects and Provincial France. London: George
Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1955.
Codeville, Angelo. Modern France. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court 
Press, 1974.
0 0
Cohn-Bendit, Daniel. La revolte etudiante, les animateurs parlent. 
Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1968.
Comite d'etude et de liason des interets bretons (C.E.L.I.B.), ed. 
Bretagne: Une Ambition nouvelle. Rennes: Presses
Universitaire, 1971.
Croisat,M. & M.-F. Souchon. Regionalization in France. Paris: 
Editions Guillamard, 1972.
Crozier, Michael. Strategies For Change. Cambridge, Mass: Massa­
chusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1982.
Duhamel, Maurice. _La Question bretonne dans son cadre europeen. 
Quimper: Cahiers de l'avenir de la Bretagne, 1978.
Dulong, Renaud. La Question bretonne. Paris: Fondation nationale
des sciences politiques, 1975.
Durant, Will and Ariel. The Age of Voltaire. New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1965.
. Rousseau and the Revolution. New York: Simon & Schuster,
1965.
Earle, Edward Mead. Modern France. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1951.
Ferniot, Jean. Mort d^une revolution: La Gauche de Mai. Paris: 
Editions de Noel, 1968.
154
Fisher, M.F.K. The Cooking of Provincial France. Alexandria, 
Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1968.
Fouere, Yann. La Bretagne (fclar telee: essal pour servlr _a
l'histoire de dix ans, 1938-1948. Paris: Nouvelles editions
latines, 1976.
Godechot, Jacques. La contre-revolution: doctrine et action, 1789-
1904. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1961.
. Les institutions de la France sous la Revolution et l'Empire.
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968.
Gourevitch, Peter. Paris and the Provinces. New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1972.
Gretton, John. Students and Workers: An Analytical Account of
Dissent in France, May-June, 1968. London: Macdonald & Company, 
1969.
Guin, Yannick. Histoire de la Bretagne. Paris: Librairie Fran-
cais Maspero, 1977.
Hauss, Charles. The New Left in France. London: Greenwood Press,
1978.
Hechter, Michael, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British
National Development From 1536-1966. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1975.
Helias, Pierre-Jakez. The Horse of Pride: Life in a Breton Village.
New Haven: Yale Universtiy Press, 1978.
Hobsbawm, E.J. Primitive Rebels. New York: Frederick A. Praeger
1959.
______ . Revolutionaries. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973.
Hodgson, Godfrey. America In Our Time: From World War II to Nixon:
What Happened and Why. New York: Vintage Books, 1976.
Hughes, H. Stuart. The Obstructed Path: French Social Thought in
the Years of Desperation. New York: Harper and Row, 1963.
Institut armoricain de recherches econommiques et humaines.
Universite de Haute^Brelague, Rennes. Paris: Klincksieck, 1976.
Isaak, Robert A. European Politics: Political Economy and Policy
Making in Western Democracies. New York: St. Martin's Press,
1980.
Kerouac, Jack. Satori in Paris. London: Quartet Books, 1966.
155
Kesselman, Mark. The Ambiguous Consensus. New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1967.
Lavroff, Dmitri-Georges. Le Systeme Politique Francais de la 
Ve Republique. Paris: Dalloz, 1932.
Lefebvre, Georges. The Coming of the French Revolution. Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979.
Markale, Jean. Histoire Secrete de la Bretagne. Paris: Albin
Michel, 1977.
Mayo, Patricia Elton. The Roots of Identity: Three National Move­
ments in Contempoary European Politics. London: Allen Lane,
'1974.
Mordrel, Olivier. Breiz Atao ou Histoire et actualite du nationalism 
breton. Paris: Editions de la Table Ronde, 1969.
L^Essence de la Bretagne. Finistere: Kelenn, 1977.
Myhill, Henry. Brittany. London: Faber and Faber, 1969.
Peyrefitte, Alain. The Trouble With France. New :York: Alfred 
A. Knopff, 1981.
/
Phlipponneau, Michel. Debout Bretagne! Saint-Brieuc: Presses 
Universitaires de Bretagne, 1970.
_______. Decentralisation et regionalisation: la grande affaire.
Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1981.
 . La Gauche et les regions. Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1967.
Plevin,Rene. Avenir de la Bretagne. Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1961.
Ramsay, Robert. The Corsican Time-Bomb. Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1983.
Reece, Jack E. The Bretons Against France: Ethnic Minority Nation­
alism in Twentieth-Century Brittany. Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1977.
Richards, Peter G. The Reformed Local Government System. London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1978.
t
Servan-Schreioer, Jean-Jacques. Le Defi Americain. Paris: Denoel,
1967.
Shorter, Edward, and Charles Tilly. Strikes in France: 1830-1968.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974.
156
Sutherland, Donald. The Chouans: The Social Origins of Popular
Counter-Revolution in Upper Brittany, 1770-1796. Oxford: Claren­
don Press, 1982.
Le Syndicalisme Paysan. Published by the Fondation Nationale des 
Sciences Politiques. Paris: Armand Colin, 1969.
Tarrow, Sidney. Between Center and periphery: Grassroots Polltl-
cians in Italy and France. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1977.
Thompson, J.M. The French Revolution. London: Oxford University 
Press, 1966.
Thompson, William Irwin. The Imagination of an Insurrection:
Dublin, Easter 1916. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.
Uris, Jill and Leon. Ireland: A Terrible Beauty. New York: Bantam
Books, 1978.
Weber, Eugen. Peasants Into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural 
France, 1870-1914. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976.
Wolfers, Arnold. Britain and France Between Two Wars. New York:
The Norton Library, 1966.
Wright, Gordon. Rural Revolution in France: The Peasantry in the
Twentieth Century. Stanford: University Press, 1964.
Wright, Vincent. The Government and Politics of France. New York: 
Holmes & Meier, 1983.
Zeldin, Theodore. Conflicts in French Society. London: George
Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1970.
NEWSPAPERS
Le Monde, May-June, 1968.
Le Moniteur Universel, 1 Floreal, Year X, [20 April, 1302]. 
Manchester Guardian Weekly, 30 March, 1986.
New York Times, May-June, 1968.
Ouest-France, 9 February, 1985.
157
RECORDINGS
Sainte-Marie, Bully. Native North American Indian Child: An
Odyssey. New York: Vanguard Recording Society, 1974.
Stivell, Alan. Deliverance. London: Fontana Records, 1974.
From Celtic Roots. London: Fontana Records, 1974.
Renaissance of the Celtic Harp. London: Fontana Records,
1971.
UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPTS
Loring, Anne C. "What Happened in France During the 'Angry
Days of May’?" Undergraduate Thesis in History, William Woods 
College, March 30, 1976.
Mordrel, Olivier. "L’Essence de la Bretagne," [1939]. Manuscript 
file 8*85524, Bibliotheque Mazarine, Paris.
Rousseau, Mark 0. "Decentralized Power in Socialized France."
Presented at the 49th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Sociological 
Society in St. Louis, Missouri, April 10-13, 1985.
INTERVIEWS AND CONVERSATIONS
Assistant archivist, Archives Departementales du Morbihan, Vannes, 
Brittany.
Breton farmer, near Saint-Brieuc, Brittany, May 11, 1985.
Gravouill, Marie Anne. Omaha, Nebraska, July, 1986.
Phlipponneau, Michel. Rennes, Brittany, June, 1973.
Phlipponneau, Sylvain. Rennes, Brittany, June, 1973, and Oxford, 
England, June, 1975.
Students, La Sorbonne, Paris, June, 1976.
